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Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century - Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic, Shinsuke Satsuma

Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century - Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic, Shinsuke Satsuma

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Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century - Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic, Shinsuke Satsuma

Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century - Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic, Shinsuke Satsuma

This book covers a slightly less familiar period of military history – the War of the Spanish Succession and its immediate successors, in a period when the Royal Navy didn't rule the seas (although as the text makes clear many politicians and commentators appear to have believed it did).

Don't expect any great detail on the actual maritime expeditions of the period. The focus here is very much on the British domestic political scene. That doesn't mean that there is no coverage of the naval expeditions of the period, but it isn't the main purpose of the book.

One reason for this is the relative ineffectiveness of the Royal Navy in this period, at least compared to public expectations. The political debate looked back to the perceived glories of Elizabethan naval warfare, and forward to the perceived benefits to be gained from possible naval expeditions (in particular from the seizure of the Spanish silver convoys from the New World). That also indicates an novel aspect of this period – much writing on British naval warfare in the age of sail covers periods when France was the main enemy, but here Spain features much more heavily.

The key questions asked here are: who was in favour of maritime expeditions; what did they expect to get out of them; how realistic were those expectations; what impact did these agitations have on actual British naval policy; how successful were those expeditions that did take place and what were the limits on those expeditions. We are taken into the heart of a series of political debates, with the players on each side often changing their views as they fell in and out of power. These are key questions, and as a result this is a valuable addition to the literature on naval warfare.


1 - English Expansion into Spanish America and the Development of a Pro-maritime War Argument

Part 1: Pro-maritime War Arguments during the War of the Spanish Succession
2 - The Idea of Economic Advantages of Maritime War in Spanish America
3 - Pro-maritime War Arguments and Party Politics

Part 2: Impact on Reality
4 - Impact on Reality: Naval Policy
5 - Impact on Reality: Legislation
6 - The South Sea Company and its Plan for a Naval Expedition in 1712

Part 3: Pro-Maritime War Arguments After 1714
7 - Pro-maritime War Arguments during the War of the Quadruple Alliance and Anglo-Spanish Conflict of 1726-29
8 - Changes in Naval Policy after 1714: From Conquest to Security of Trade

Author: Shinsuke Satsuma
Edition: Hardcover
Pages: 296
Publisher: Boydell
Year: 2013

Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century - Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic, Shinsuke Satsuma - History

I am an early career academic researching the social history of early modern seafarers, and more broadly interested in the political, cultural, and economic histories of the early modern period. My research interests include the role of seafarers in various maritime 'worlds' (Atlantic, Mediterranean, North Sea, Indian Ocean) the social aspects of the maritime community the relationship between seafarers, the navy, and state-formation and the social and cultural aspects of early modern navigation. My present project focuses on the role of British seafarers within the development of empire and international trade from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth centuries.

I am Lecturer in the History of the Atlantic World at the University of Reading. Before coming to Reading I worked on the 'Sailing into modernity' project, based at the Centre for Maritime Historical Studies, University of Exeter, where I am still an honorary member, and spent two years as a Junior Research Fellow at Merton College, Oxford. I am also a Trustee of the British Commission for Maritime History and an adviser to the MarineLives project.

Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic.

Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic.

What was the purpose of Britain's 18th century wars in the West Indies, including the establishment of naval bases in Antigua and Jamaica? Satsuma picks up the argument here that their main purpose was easy financial gain, while inflicting financial damage on Spain, and to a lesser extent France and the Netherlands. This volume explores the internal British cases for pro-maritime wars, both during the War of the Spanish Succession that ran from 1702-13, and afterwards during both the War of Quadruple Alliance of 1718-20 and the Anglo-Spanish Conflict of 1726-29. A middle section analyzes the impact of this line of reasoning on both naval policy and parliamentary legislation, paying special attention to the American Act of 1708. One additional chapter explores the establishment of the South Sea Company and the plans, later abandoned, for a naval expedition supporting it in 1712. A two page expansion of acronyms is given at the beginning of the book. This work is based on Satsuma's dissertation in history at the University of Exeter.

The Temptations of Trade: Britain, Spain, and the Struggle for Empire, by Adrian Finucane

Jeremy Black, The Temptations of Trade: Britain, Spain, and the Struggle for Empire, by Adrian Finucane, The English Historical Review, Volume 133, Issue 562, June 2018, Pages 724–725, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cey106

Taking forward recent work by a number of scholars—particularly Satsuma Shinsuke in his excellent Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic (2013)—Adrian Finucane considers relations between Britain and Spain, notably over Caribbean trade in the early eighteenth century. The complexities of links, from government to the role of individuals, emerge clearly, although the context, in Britain, Spain and the Caribbean, was far from consistent. For example, the Tory ministry that negotiated a settlement with France in the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, ending British participation in the War of the Spanish Succession, was committed, in part in reaction to Whig interventionism on the Continent in the 1700s, to a policy of commercial growth.

Britain and Colonial Maritime War By Shinsuke Satsuma

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Update to 31 May 2016 at HistoryofWar.org: Aichi Aircraft, Douglas Aircraft, USAA Fighter Groups, Monaghan class destroyers, France 1814, US Medium Tanks, Decline of Sparta

This month we look at the wars that triggered the decline of Ancient Sparta, first leading to the first defeat of a major Spartan hoplite army, and then stripping away many of her possessions in the Peloponnese. Our series of Napoleon's defence of France in 1814 covers his last few victories, bringing us up to his recapture of Rheims late on 13 March. At sea we continue with our series of articles on the Monaghan class US destroyers of the First World War, while in the air we look at Aichi and Douglas aircraft, and fighter groups of the US Ninth Air Force. Finally our series on tanks looks at the US Medium tanks that led up to the M2 Medium tank, the direct ancestor of the M4 Sherman.

The Aichi B7A Ryusei (Shooting Star) 'Grace' was a large torpedo bomber designed for use on a new generation of Japanese aircraft carriers, but that only saw limited service from land after the Japanese carrier fleet was destroyed.

The Aichi D1A Diver Bomber 'Susie' was a carrier dive-bomber based on the Heinkel He 66 that saw service with the Japanese Navy during the 1930s.

The Aichi H9A flying boat was the only dedicated flying boat trainer to be placed into production in significant numbers during the Second World War.

The Aichi S1A Denko (Bolt of Light) was a Japanese Navy night fighter that was at an advanced stage of development before US bombing destroyed the two prototypes, effectively ending the programme.

The Douglas RD was the Navy version of the Douglas Dolphin twin-engined amphibious aircraft, and was produced in a number of variants for the Navy and Coast Guard.

The Douglas C-29 Dolphin was the most powerful aircraft in the Dolphin series and was powered by two 550hp engines.

The 366th Fighter Group served with the Ninth Air Force and took part in the D-Day invasion, the advance across France, Operation Market Garden, the Battle of the Bulge and the invasion of Germany.

The 367th Fighter Group served with the Ninth Air Force and took part on the D-Day invasion, the advance across France, the Battle of the Bulge and the invasion of Germany.

The 368th Fighter Group served with the Ninth Air Force and took part in the D-Day invasion, the siege of Cherbourg, the advance across France, the attack on Germany and the Battle of the Bulge.

USS Fanning (DD-37) was a Monaghan class destroyer that took part in the US intervention in Mexico in 1914, and helped sink U-58, one of only two Germans submarines sunk by US destroyers during the First World War.

USS Jarvis (DD-38) was a Monaghan class destroyer that took part in the US intervention in Mexico in 1914, then served from Queenstown and Brest during the First World War.

USS Henley (DD-39) was a Monaghan class destroyer that was used to test geared turbines, then operated along the US East Coast after the American entry into the First World War. In the 1920s she served with the Coast Guard, before being sold for scrap in 1934.

USS Beale (DD-40) was a Monaghan class destroyer that took part in the US intervention in Mexico in 1914, patrolled US waters in 1917 and operated from Queenstown during 1918. She spent part of the 1920s operating with the Coast Guard.

USS Jouett (DD-41) was a Monaghan class destroyer that took part in the US intervention in Mexico in 1914, then largely operated off the US coast after the American entry into the First World War. In the 1920s she was loaned to the Coast Guard.

USS Jenkins (DD-42) was a Monaghan class destroyer that took part in the US intervention in Mexico in 1914, then operated from Queenstown in Ireland during 1917-18.

The battle of Montereau (18 February 1814) was Napoleon's last significant victory over General Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia during the campaign of 1814, and forced Schwarzenberg to retreat east from the vicinity of Paris back towards Troyes.

The battle of Bar-sur-Aube (27 February 1814) was one of a series of defeats suffered by Napoleon's subordinates during the campaign of 1814, and saw a combined Russian and Bavarian force defeat Marshal Oudinot after an attempt to convince the Allies that Napoleon was still present in that area failed.

The battle of Craonne (7 March 1814) was a rare example of a battle where both commanders misjudged the situation and was unsatisfactory for both the French and the Allies, although counts as a narrow French victory.

The battle of Laon (8-9 March 1814) was a French defeat that ended Napoleon's hope of defeating Blucher for a second time during the campaign of 1814 and forced him to retreat into a position between the two main Allied armies.

The battle of Arcis-sur-Aube (20-21 March 1814) was Napoleon's last major battle during the campaign of 1814 and saw him misjudge his opponents, march into a dangerous trap and then manage to extricate much of his army.

The battle of Rheims (13 March 1814) was Napoleon's last significant success during the 1814 campaign, and saw his troops recapture Rheims in a night attack, briefly causing a panic amongst the Allied commanders.

The Medium Tank T1 was the final attempt to produce an effective tank on the basis of the earlier Medium Tank M1921, but although it was briefly accepted as the Medium Tank M1 it never entered production.

The Medium Tank T2 was a 15ton tank that was judged to be the best tank yet designed by the US Ordnance Department when it was tested in 1931, but that didn't enter production because of financial restrictions during the Great Depression.

The Medium Tank T4/ Medium Tank M1 was the last medium tank to use Christie style convertible running gear, and was based on the Combat Car T4, itself developed from the Christie M1931/ Medium Tank T3.

The Medium Tank T5 was the prototype for the Medium Tank M2, and was also the first in the series of designs that ended with the M4 Sherman.

The battle of Apollonia (381 BC) saw Sparta's ally Derdas of Elimia defeat an Olynthian cavalry raid that had entered the territory of Apollonia.

The battle of Olynthus (381 BC) was the second battle fought by the Spartans close to the city during their expedition to Chalcidice, and ended with defeat and the death of the Spartan commander Teleutias.

The Theban campaign of 378 BC was the first of two unsuccessful invasions of Boeotia led by King Agesilaus II of Sparta, and ended after a standoff close to the city of Thebes.

The battle of Thespiae (378 BC) was a Theban victory that ended a period of Sparta raids from their base at Thespiae, and in which the Spartan commander Phoebidas was killed.The Theban-Spartan War or Boeotian War (379-371 BC) was a conflict triggered by Sparta's attempts to impose her dominance over the rest of Greece, and that ended with a dramatic Spartan defeat that marked the beginning of the end for Sparta as a great power.

The Theban Hegemony (371-362) was a short period in which the battlefield victories of Epaminondas overthrew the power of Sparta, and made Thebes the most powerful state in Greece. It began with the crushing Theban victory over a Spartan army at Leuctra, and effectively ended with the death of Epaminondas at the battle of Mantinea.

Redeye - Fulda Cold, Bill Fortin.

A novel largely set on the East-West German border during the Cold War, following the experiences of an American draftee during his two years of service in the late 1960s. Feels far more like an autobiography than a novel, with a mix of historical and fictional figures, while the lead character is involved on the edge of a piece of Cold War military diplomacy.

The Rebel in Me - A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Rhodesian Bosh War, 1975-1980, Agrippah Mutambara .

Very much the insider's view of the Liberation struggle in Zimbabwe (with about half of the book looking at the Rhodesian attack on the ZANLA HQ at Chimoio), written by a key figure in the political side of the struggle who is still loyal to Mugabe. Fascinating material on the ZANLA struggle, just be aware that politically this is very one sided.

The Siege of LZ Kate, Arthur G. Sharp .

Looks at the short but fierce North Vietnamese siege of a US firebase close to the Cambodia border, and the dramatic night time escape that saw the besieged US and allied soldiers escape from this trap. The siege only really lasted four days, so is covered in some detail, especially of the invaluable air support that kept the base supplied, evacuated the wounded and provided fire power to defend the isolated post against much larger attacking force.

Moltke and His Generals: A Study in Leadership, Quintin Barry.
Looks at the relationship between Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Wars of German Unification, and the generals he had to work with. Shows the skill with which he managed a very varied group of officers, of different levels of skill, independence and stubbornness. Also helps explain why the Prussian needed a system where professional staff officers worked alongside unit commanders, many of whom had aristocratic or royal backgrounds.
[read full review]

SS: Hitler's Foreign Divisions - Foreign Volunteers in the Waffen-SS, 1940-45, Chris Bishop.
Looks at the surprisingly large number of foreign troops who fought with the SS during the Second World War, starting with a country-by-country examination of the motivation, scale and organisation of recruitment, and then turning to a unit by unit account of their often rather unimpressive combat record. Covers a mix of units, including a handful of high qualify front line divisions but far more vicious anti-partisan units with dreadful records and late war units thrown together as the Nazi empire crumbled.
[read full review]

Honourable Warriors: Fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, Richard Streatfield.
Follows the experience of a company commander operating in Sangin in 2009-2010, during a period of intense active operations in which his unit slowly began to win control of the area away from the local Taliban, although at fairly heavy cost. Contains a detailed analysis of the correct way to operate in this sort of environment if there was to be any chance of long term success, and how that was implemented at company level.
[read full review]

The Winter War, Eloise Engle and Lauri Paananen .
A classic account of this early offshoot of the Second World War, written largely from the Finnish point of view (perhaps inevitably given the limited amount of reliable Soviet sources in the 1970s). Although more recent works exist, this is an excellent starting point and gives a good feel for the impact of the war on the Finns.
[read full review]

The Men Who Gave Us Wings: Britain and the Aeroplane 1796-1914, Peter Reese.
An interesting account of the early days of flight in Britain, from the research into gliders, through various unsuccessful attempts at powered flights and into the post-Wright Brothers world, when the pioneers of the British aviation industry came to the fore, a group of remarkable men that included the Short brothers, A.V. Roe, Geoffrey de Havilland and Sir Thomas Sopwith.
[read full review]

Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century - Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic, Shinsuke Satsuma.
A look at the political influences on British naval policy during the first half of the eighteenth century, a period in which Spain was still the main focus of naval warfare and Spanish silver still held sway in many imaginations. Focuses very much on the political scene in Britain, rather than the details of actual naval expeditions, although these are also covered.
[read full review]

A Biographical Dictionary of the Twentieth Century Royal Navy: Volume 1 Admirals of the Fleet and Admirals, Alastair Wilson .

The start of a large project to produce a dictionary of 20th Century British Naval Biography, starting with Admirals and Admirals of the Fleet. Split into two, with the biographies in pdf form on CD and a printed volume to explain the format and contents of the biography. This is a very useful reference work in its own right – it'll certainly be of great use for me as I try and track down some of the more obscure wartime admirals – and the complete series will be a very impressive achievement.

Watershed - Angola and Mozambique: A Photo-History - The Portuguese Collapse in Africa, 1974-75, Wilf Nussey.

An excellent photographic history of the end of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, triggered by the overthrow of the Fascist regime back in Portugal. Based around the photos take by the Argus Africa News Service, supported by a text written by the then head of the service. Follows a tragic tale of great but disappointed expectations after Independence was followed by prolonged civil wars in both countries.

On the Precipice: Stalin, the Red Army Leadership and the Road to Stalingrad 1931-42, Peter Mezhiritsky.

An account of the road to Stalingrad loosely based around a discussion of Marshal Zhukov's memoirs, but focusing on Stalin's role in the catastrophes that almost overwhelmed the Soviet Union after the German invasion of 1941. Often conversational in tone, and with a tendency to indulge in flights of fantasy and speculation, this is still an entertaining read that provides an interesting point of view on this devastating period.

What is the Long Term Impact of the War of the Spanish Succession on Europe?

The War of the Spanish Succession was a devastating war that occurred from 1702-1715. It embroiled all of Europe's major powers, including Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Prussia and other German kingdoms, Italian kingdoms, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The main result of the war is that it prevented France from unifying itself with Spain after the death of Charles II from the Habsburg dynasty. However, more than resolving this possible unification, it created a new order of power that had global consequences.

War and its Outcomes

The war was initially sparked by the death of Charles II, the last Habsburg monarch on the throne of Spain (Figure 1). Charles II had promised the throne to Philip, Duke of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV. With the death of Charles and Philip being proclaimed king in Spain, Louis XIV embarked on taking the rest of the Spanish territories, particularly in Spanish Netherlands. This was seen as an attempt by Louis to unify much of Western Europe under his control and solidifying France's dominance in Europe. This triggered an alliance between the Dutch, England, Prussia, Hanover, other German states, and Portugal. On the other side, France's Louis was allied with Bavaria, Cologne, Mantua, and Savoy's dukes. However, Savoy later switched sides. [1]

England was ably led on the battlefield by the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy. Due to a falling out, Prince Eugene had switched his alliance from France to England's one. With perhaps Europe's two most able generals, under Marlborough and Prince Eugene, decisive victories were achieved that reversed French gains. They were forced to retreat from Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. In particular, the British relied less on its monarchy, and parliament played a more active role in the war. By 1708, France was ready to make terms. Nevertheless, British demands proved onerous, as Britain wanted Louis to send his own army to depose his own grandson from his throne in Spain. This led to the war to drag on.

However, by 1711, things had changed, as the Duke of Marlborough fell out with his English backers and the rise of Archduke Charles from the Habsburg's in Austria changed the situation, where his rise threatened to bring Spain back under him. In effect, it diminished the appetite in Europe for continuing the war. Additionally, the alliance against France found difficulty fighting in Spain itself, where the territory and fighting proved more difficult. This led to an eventual series of treaties that ended the war, starting in 1713 (Treaty of Utrecht) and then later the treaties of Rastatt and Baden. [2]

The treaties effectively kept Spain under Louis' grandson, where now the House of Bourbon ruled, although it also meant it could not unite with Spain. Furthermore, France and Spain were forced to give up territories, including the Spanish Netherlands and Naples in Europe. Other smaller territories such as Gibraltar were lost. In the New World, Newfoundland was given to the British forces. Effectively, the war, according to the parties that accepted the treaties, kept the balance of power in Europe, where France and Spain retained their desire for a Bourbon king. Still, that power was not as strong as Louis initially desired, as it had to give up territories. The war could have been more of a disaster for France. Still, by 1711-13 they were in a better position to negotiate. [3]

Long-Term Impact

While, in principle, the war maintained a balance in European politics among the powers, the reality was different. First, the new United Kingdom that had formally united Scotland with England had emerged as a global power, in strong part, thanks to the war and its aftermath. Britain gained several key territories, particularly in the New World, such as Newfoundland, and access to trade and areas where the French had once dominated. Additionally, they controlled Gibraltar, taking it from Spain (and still have to this day).

However, rather than mainly weakening their main enemy, France, the war significantly weakened the Dutch, where large debts straddled them. This now allowed Britain to take over many trade opportunities in Africa, North America, and in particular in India and the east that the Dutch once controlled. Britain's rise as a commercial and territorial empire had essentially accelerated due to the war's consequences. In fact, the rise of the British India East Company, for instance, greatly hastened after this time, particularly as the Dutch East India Company's fortunes began to wane soon after the war (Figure 2). [4]

For the Dutch, the war dragged for a long time, and the population of three million could not cope with a large debt. In essence, the Dutch had been very influential in European affairs in the 17th century. Still, after this war, that influence had declined sharply as their maritime empire, and trading prowess declined due to the war's debts and cost. In effect, despite being on the side that gained the most from the war's ending, the Dutch saw significant losses in their overall influence and economic prowess. [5]

For France, the war seemed to go disastrous in the first few years, but by the end of the war, they were in a stronger position, and despite losses in North America, they did not lose the bulk of their colonies. What may have weakened France was more to do with France's monarchy had become too centralized and strong. Additionally, the war's costs had a long-term consequence, like France, after this war, began to find it more difficult to pay for its conflicts, incurring more debt. This created greater distance between the French government and the French people, where over time, this distance proved devastating and helped lead to the French Revolution. In fact, the later Seven Year War and American Revolution likely contributed more to the decline of France's royal family. The flexibility of the parliamentary system, however, which did not depend on a strong ruler, such as the system in Britain, may have an effect and influence through demonstrating its effectiveness in conducting campaigns by changing leadership and not being prone to impulsive monarchs. [6]

For Spain, the war brought a large territorial loss in Europe, although its overseas empire remained intact. Never again did Spain arise to be as influential as it was in European affairs in the 16th and 17th centuries. The main effect was the new ruling house, the Bourbons, brought new ideas in government and administration that had developed in France, allowing Spain to more rapidly modernizing its political infrastructure in the 18th century. This briefly restored Spanish power, although it never gained its dominance before the war in European affairs. Spain also became more centralized, where King Philip united the crowns of Aragon and Castile. [7]

Effects on States Today

The effects of the war are evident today. In Gibraltar, Spain wants the territory back, where it is still a British overseas territory. The rise of Britain after the war also enabled it to become the largest empire in history. In particular, Britain was better able to focus on the East after this war, as the East India Company arose as a commercial and later territorial power. In effect, by dominating sea trade, after the Dutch's collapse, Britain had a way to finance its overseas empire. This meant that no major global conflict did not involve Britain to some level after this war, as the British Empire now became the dominant trade and territorial empire across much of the globe. Today, this has meant many countries have effectively taken up the legacies of British imperial rule. In India, for instance, legacies on education, government, and language are evident. This is also true in other countries that Britain was able to expand into as its overseas power increased, including in Africa and Asia. [8]

The war helped to lead to the downfall of France's monarchy, as it increasingly became isolated from its population and more centralized. High financial costs also led to debt that made it difficult for France to recover from. In France and elsewhere in Western Europe, particularly as the French Revolution became influential, the gradual move toward parliamentary systems began to hasten, as devastating wars showed monarchical-led states' weakness. In effect, the road to Western Europe's democracies hastened due to the costliness and changes brought about by wars such as the Spanish Succession War.

Furthermore, the Spanish Succession War showed that devastating wars could be created by simply having a monarch die without heirs. Creating systems that can withstand changes to any individual family or household proved to be more attractive as the European Enlightenment continued. The states we see today in Western Europe reflect the evolutionary changes that were shaped by the war, as its financial and human costs began to lead to different forms of states that governed with less dependence on monarchs. [9]


At first, the Spanish Succession War appeared to be similar to other wars that dominated Europe in the late 17th century. However, the long-term nature of the conflict and lack of clear resolution for many years led to it being costly for some countries, particularly the Dutch and Spain, while others greatly benefited, such as Britain. This helped shape global affairs that developed in the next few centuries, as Britain came to dominate global trade and world affairs. In the long-term, however, European monarchies failed to easily resolve an issue such as succession without launching major wars that helped to weaken the influence of monarchies throughout Europe. This process had started in Britain earlier, during the English Civil War, but the War of the Spanish Succession and later Seven Years War helped to hasten the French monarchy's demise. The rise of the French Republic would be another critical step in Europe to removing the influence of monarchies, but the War of the Spanish Succession shaped this process in many ways. Some of Western Europe's last remaining territorial conflicts, such as the debate regarding Gibraltar, is also a legacy from this war.

Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century - Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic, Shinsuke Satsuma - History

研究協力者の 薩摩真介 著 Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic , Boydell & Brewer(September 19, 2013)が出版されました。是非ご一読ください。


  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 English Expansion into Spanish America and the Development of a Pro-maritime War Argument
  • 3 Idea of Economic Advantages of Maritime War in Spanish America
  • 4 Pro-maritime War Arguments and Party Politics
  • 5 Impact on Reality: Naval Policy
  • 6 Impact on Reality: Legislation
  • 7 The South Sea Company and its Plan for a Naval Expedition in 1712
  • 8 Pro-maritime War Argument during the War of the Quadruple Alliance and Anglo-Spanish Conflict of 1726-29
  • 9 Changes in Naval Policy after 1714: From Conquest to Security of Trade
  • 10 Conclusion

In early modern Britain, there was an argument that war at sea, especially war in Spanish America, was an ideal means of warfare, offering the prospect of rich gains at relatively little cost whilst inflicting considerable damage on enemy financial resources. This book examines that argument, tracing its origin to the glorious memory of Elizabethan maritime war, discussing its supposed economic advantages, and investigating its influence on British politics and naval policy during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13) and after. The book reveals that the alleged economic advantages of war at sea were crucial in attracting the support of politicians of different political stances. It shows how supporters of war at sea, both in the government as well as in the opposition, tried to implement pro-maritime war policy by naval operations, colonial expeditions and by legislation, and how their attempts were often frustrated by diplomatic considerations, the incapacity of naval administration, and by conflicting interests between different groups connected to the West Indian colonies and Spanish American trade. It demonstrates how, after the War of the Spanish Succession, arguments for active colonial maritime war continued to be central to political conflict, notably in the opposition propaganda campaigns against the Walpole ministry, culminating in the War of Jenkins's Ear against Spain in 1739. The book also includes material on the South Sea Company, showing how the foundation of this company, later the subject of the notorious 'Bubble', was a logical part of British strategy. Shinsuke Satsuma completed his doctorate in maritime history at the University of Exeter.


The cause of the war is traditionally seen as a dispute between Britain and Spain over access to markets in Spanish America. Historians such as Anderson and Woodfine argue it was one of several issues, including tensions with France and British expansion in North America. They suggest the decisive factor in turning a commercial dispute into war was the domestic political campaign to remove Robert Walpole, long-serving British Prime Minister. [7]

The 18th century economic theory of mercantilism viewed trade as a finite resource if one country increased its share, it was at the expense of others and wars were often fought over commercial issues. [8] The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht gave British merchants access to markets in Spanish America, including the Asiento de Negros, a monopoly to supply 5,000 slaves a year. Another was the Navio de Permiso, permitting two ships a year to sell 500 tons of goods each in Porto Bello in present-day Panama and Veracruz in present-day Mexico. [9] These rights were assigned to the South Sea Company, acquired by the British government in 1720. [10]

However, trade between Britain and mainland Spain was far more significant. British goods were imported through Cadiz, either for sale locally or re-exported to Spanish colonies, with Spanish dye and wool being sold to England. A leading City of London merchant called the trade 'the best flower in our garden.' [11] The asiento itself was marginally profitable and has been described as a 'commercial illusion' between 1717 and 1733, only eight ships were sent from Britain to the Americas. [12] Previous holders made money by carrying smuggled goods that evaded customs duties, demand from Spanish colonists creating a large and profitable black market. [13]

Accepting the trade was too widespread to be stopped, the Spanish authorities used it as an instrument of policy. During the 1727 to 1729 Anglo-Spanish War, French ships carrying contraband were let through, while British ships were stopped and severe restrictions imposed on British merchants in Cadiz. This was reversed during the 1733 to 1735 War of the Polish Succession, when Britain supported Spanish acquisitions in Italy. [14]

The 1729 Treaty of Seville allowed the Spanish to board British vessels trading with the Americas. In 1731, Robert Jenkins claimed his ear was amputated by coast guard officers after they discovered contraband aboard his ship Rebecca. Such incidents were seen as the cost of doing business and were forgotten after the easing of restrictions in 1732. [15] Although an earless Jenkins was exhibited in the House of Commons, and war declared in 1739, [16] the legend that his severed ear was shown to the House of Commons has no basis in fact. [17]

Tensions increased after the founding of the British colony of Georgia in 1732, which Spain considered a threat to Spanish Florida, vital to protect shipping routes with mainland Spain. [18] For their part, the British viewed the 1733 Pacte de Famille between Louis XV and his uncle Philip V as the first step in being replaced by France as Spain's largest trading partner. [19]

A second round of "depredations" in 1738 led to demands for compensation, British newsletters and pamphlets presenting them as inspired by France. [20] Linking these allowed the Tory opposition to imply failure to act was due to George II's concerns over exposing Hanover to French attack. Resistance to European 'entanglements' was an ongoing theme in English politics, going back to the 17th century. [21]

The January 1739 Convention of Pardo set up a Commission to resolve the Georgia-Florida boundary dispute and agreed Spain would pay damages of £95,000 for ships seized. In return, the South Sea Company would pay £68,000 to Philip V as his share of profits on the asiento. Despite being controlled by the government, the company refused and Walpole reluctantly accepted his political opponents wanted war. [22]

On 10 July 1739, the Admiralty was authorised to begin naval operations against Spain and on 20th, a force under Admiral Vernon sailed for the West Indies. [23] He reached Antigua in early October on 22 October, British ships attacked La Guaira and Puerto Cabello, principal ports of the Province of Venezuela and Britain formally declared war on 23 October 1739. [24]

The incident that gave its name to the war had occurred in 1731, off the coast of Florida, when the British brig Rebecca was boarded by the Spanish patrol boat La Isabela, commanded by the guarda costa (effectively privateer) Juan de León Fandiño. After boarding, Fandiño cut off the left ear of the Rebecca's captain, Robert Jenkins, whom he accused of smuggling (although Franklin's Pennsylvania Gazette for 7 October 1731, says it was Lieutenant Dorce). [4] Fandiño told Jenkins, "Go, and tell your King that I will do the same, if he dares to do the same." In March 1738, Jenkins was ordered to testify before Parliament, presumably to repeat his story before a committee of the House of Commons. According to some accounts, he produced the severed ear as part of his presentation, although no detailed record of the hearing exists. [25] The incident was considered alongside various other cases of "Spanish Depredations upon the British Subjects", [26] and was perceived as an insult to Britain's honour and a clear casus belli. [27]

The conflict was named by essayist and historian Thomas Carlyle, in 1858, one hundred and ten years after hostilities ended. Carlyle mentioned the ear in several passages of his History of Friedrich II (1858), most notably in Book XI, chapter VI, where he refers specifically to "the War of Jenkins's Ear".

First attack on La Guaira (22 October 1739) Edit

Vernon sent three ships commanded by Captain Thomas Waterhouse to intercept Spanish ships between La Guaira and Porto Bello. He decided to attack a number of vessels that he observed at La Guaira, which was controlled by the Royal Guipuzcoan Company of Caracas. [28] The governor of the Province of Venezuela, Brigadier Don Gabriel de Zuloaga had prepared the port defences, and Spanish troops were well-commanded by Captain Don Francisco Saucedo. On 22 October, Waterhouse entered the port of La Guaira flying the Spanish flag. Expecting attack, the port gunners were not deceived by his ruse they waited until the British squadron was within range and then simultaneously opened fire. After three hours of heavy shelling, Waterhouse ordered a withdrawal. The battered British squadron sailed to Jamaica to undertake emergency repairs. Trying later to explain his actions, Waterhouse argued that the capture of a few small Spanish vessels would not have justified the loss of his men.

Capture of Portobelo (20–22 November 1739) Edit

Prior to 1739, trade between mainland Spain and its colonies was conducted only through specific ports twice a year, outward bound ships assembled in Cadiz and the Flota escorted to Portobelo or Veracruz. One way to impact Spanish trade was by attacking or blockading these ports but as many ships carried cargoes financed by foreign merchants, the strategy also risked damaging British and neutral interests. [29]

During the 1727 to 1729 Anglo-Spanish War, the British attempted to take Portobelo but retreated after heavy losses from disease. On 22 November 1739, Vernon attacked the port with six ships of the line it fell within twenty-four hours and the British occupied the town for three weeks before withdrawing, having first destroyed its fortifications, port and warehouses. [30]

The victory was widely celebrated in Britain the song "Rule Britannia" was written in 1740 to mark the occasion and performed for the first time at a dinner in London honouring Vernon. [31] The suburb of Portobello in Edinburgh and Portobello Road in London are among the places in Britain named after this success, while more medals were awarded for its capture than any other event in the eighteenth century. [32]

However, taking a port in Spain's American empire was considered a foregone conclusion by many Patriot Whigs and opposition Tories. They now pressed a reluctant Walpole to launch larger naval expeditions to the Gulf of Mexico. In the longer term, the Spanish replaced the twice yearly Flota with a larger number of smaller convoys, calling at more ports and Portobelo's economy did not recover until the building of the Panama Canal nearly two centuries later. [ citation needed ]

First attack on Cartagena de Indias (13–20 March 1740) Edit

Following the success of Portobelo, Vernon decided to focus his efforts on the capture of Cartagena de Indias in present-day Colombia. Both Vernon and Edward Trelawny, governor of Jamaica, considered the Spanish gold shipping port to be a prime objective. Since the outbreak of the war, and Vernon's arrival in the Caribbean, the British had made a concerted effort to gain intelligence on the defences of Cartagena. In October 1739, Vernon sent First Lieutenant Percival to deliver a letter to Blas de Lezo and Don Pedro Hidalgo, governor of Cartagena. Percival was to use the opportunity to make a detailed study of the Spanish defences. This effort was thwarted when Percival was denied entry to the port.

On 7 March 1740, in a more direct approach, Vernon undertook a reconnaissance-in-force of the Spanish city. Vernon left Port Royal in command of a squadron including ships of the line, two fire ships, three bomb vessels, and transport ships. Reaching Cartagena on 13 March, Vernon immediately landed several men to map the topography and to reconnoitre the Spanish squadron anchored in Playa Grande, west of Cartagena. Having not seen any reaction from the Spanish, on 18 March Vernon ordered the three bomb vessels to open fire on the city. Vernon intended to provoke a response that might give him a better idea of the defensive capabilities of the Spanish. Understanding Vernon's motives, Lezo did not immediately respond. Instead, Lezo ordered the removal of guns from some of his ships, in order to form a temporary shore battery for the purpose of suppressive fire. Vernon next initiated an amphibious assault, but in the face of strong resistance, the attempt to land 400 soldiers was unsuccessful. The British then undertook a three-day naval bombardment of the city. In total, the campaign lasted 21 days. Vernon then withdrew his forces, leaving HMS Windsor Castle and HMS Greenwich in the vicinity, with a mission to intercept any Spanish ship that might approach.

Destruction of the fortress of San Lorenzo el Real Chagres (22–24 March 1740) Edit

After the destruction of Portobelo the previous November, Vernon proceeded to remove the last Spanish stronghold in the area. He attacked the fortress of San Lorenzo el Real Chagres, in present-day Panama on the banks of the Chagres River, near Portobelo. The fort was defended by Spanish patrol boats, and was armed with four guns and about thirty soldiers under Captain of Infantry Don Juan Carlos Gutiérrez Cevallos.

At 3 pm on 22 March 1740, the British squadron, composed of the ships Stafford, Norwich, Falmouth and Princess Louisa, the frigate Diamond, the bomb vessels Alderney, Terrible, and Cumberland, the fireships Success and Eleanor, and transports Goodly and Pompey, under command of Vernon, began to bombard the Spanish fortress. Given the overwhelming superiority of the British forces, Captain Cevallos surrendered the fort on 24 March, after resisting for two days.

Following the strategy previously applied at Porto Bello, the British destroyed the fort and seized the guns along with two Spanish patrol boats.

During this time of British victories along the Caribbean coast, events taking place in Spain would prove to have a significant effect on the outcome of the largest engagement of the war. Spain had decided to replace Don Pedro Hidalgo as governor of Cartagena de Indias. But, the new governor-designate, Lieutenant General of the Royal Armies Sebastián de Eslava y Lazaga had first to dodge the Royal Navy in order to get to his new post. Starting from the Galician port of Ferrol, the vessels Galicia and San Carlos set out on the journey. Hearing the news, Vernon immediately sent four ships to intercept the Spanish. They were unsuccessful in their mission. The Spanish managed to circumvent the British interceptors and entered the port of Cartagena on 21 April 1740, landing there with the new governor and several hundred veteran soldiers. [33]

Second attack on Cartagena de Indias (3 May 1740) Edit

In May, Vernon returned to Cartagena de Indias aboard the flagship HMS Princess Caroline in charge of 13 warships, with the intention of bombarding the city. Lezo reacted by deploying his six ships of the line so that the British fleet was forced into ranges where they could only make short or long shots that were of little value. Vernon withdrew, asserting that the attack was merely a manoeuver. The main consequence of this action was to help the Spanish test their defences. [34]

Third attack on Cartagena de Indias (13 March – 20 May 1741) Edit

The largest action of the war was a major amphibious attack launched by the British under Admiral Edward Vernon in March 1741 against Cartagena de Indias, one of Spain's principal gold-trading ports in their colony of New Granada (today Colombia). Vernon's expedition was hampered by inefficient organisation, his rivalry with the commander of his land forces, and the logistical problems of mounting and maintaining a major trans-Atlantic expedition. The strong fortifications in Cartagena and the able strategy of Spanish Commander Blas de Lezo were decisive in repelling the attack. Heavy losses on the British side were due in large part to virulent tropical diseases, primarily an outbreak of yellow fever, which took more lives than were lost in battle. [6]

The extreme ease with which the British destroyed Porto Bello led to a change in British plans. Instead of Vernon concentrating his next attack on Havana as expected, in order to conquer Cuba, he planned to attack Cartagena de Indias. Located in Colombia, it was the main port of the Viceroyalty and main point of the West Indian fleet for sailing to the Iberian Peninsula. In preparation the British gathered in Jamaica one of the largest fleets ever assembled. It consisted of 186 ships (60 more than the famous Spanish Armada of Philip II), bearing 2,620 artillery pieces and more than 27,000 men. Of that number, 10,000 were soldiers responsible for initiating the assault. There were also 12,600 sailors, 1,000 Jamaican slaves and macheteros, and 4,000 recruits from Virginia. The latter were led by Lawrence Washington, the older half-brother of George Washington, future President of the United States. [35]

Colonial officials assigned Admiral Blas de Lezo to defend the fortified city. He was a marine veteran hardened by numerous naval battles in Europe, beginning with the War of the Spanish Succession, and by confrontations with European pirates in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, and Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean Sea. Assisting in that effort were Melchor de Navarrete and Carlos Desnaux, with a squadron of six ships of the line (the flagship vessel Galicia together with the San Felipe, San Carlos, África, Dragón, and Conquistador) and a force of 3,000 soldiers, 600 militia and a group of native Indian archers.

Vernon ordered his forces to clear the port of all scuttled ships. On 13 March 1741, he landed a contingent of troops under command of Major General Thomas Wentworth and artillery to take Fort de San Luis de Bocachica. In support of that action, the British ships simultaneously opened with cannon fire, at a rate of 62 shots per hour. In turn, Lezo ordered four of the Spanish ships to aid 500 of his troops defending Desnaux's position, but the Spanish eventually had to retire to the city. Civilians were already evacuating it. After leaving Fort Bocagrande, the Spanish regrouped at Fort San Felipe de Barajas, while Washington's Virginians took up positions in the nearby hill of La Popa. Vernon, believing the victory at hand, sent a message to Jamaica stating that he had taken the city. The report was subsequently forwarded to London, where there was much celebration. Commemorative medals were minted, depicting the defeated Spanish defenders kneeling before Vernon. [36] The robust image of the enemy depicted in the British medals bore little resemblance to Admiral Lezo. Maimed by years of battle, he was one-eyed and lame, with limited use of one hand.

On the evening of 19 April, the British mounted an assault in force upon Castillo San Felipe de Barajas. Three columns of grenadiers, supported by Jamaicans and several British companies, moved under cover of darkness, with the aid of an intense naval bombardment. The British fought their way to the base of the fort's ramparts where they discovered that the Spanish had dug deep trenches. This effectively rendered the British scaling equipment too short for the task. The British advance was stymied since the fort's walls had not been breached, and the ramparts could not be topped. Neither could the British easily withdraw in the face of intense Spanish fire and under the weight of their own equipment. The Spanish seized on this opportunity, with devastating effect.

Reversing the tide of battle, the Spanish initiated a fixed bayonet charge at first light, inflicting heavy casualties on the British. The surviving British forces retreated to the safety of their ships. The British maintained a naval bombardment, sinking what remained of the small Spanish squadron (after Lezo's decision to scuttle some of his ships in an effort to block the harbour entrance). The Spanish thwarted any British attempt to land another ground assault force. The British troops were forced to remain aboard ship for a month, without sufficient reserves. With supplies running low, and with the outbreak of disease (primarily yellow fever), which took the lives of many on the crowded ships, [37] Vernon was forced to raise the siege on 9 May and return to Jamaica. Six thousand British died while only one thousand Spanish perished.

Vernon carried on, successfully attacking the Spanish at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. On 5 March 1742, with the help of reinforcements from Europe, he launched an assault on Panama City, Panama. In 1742, Vernon was replaced by Rear-Admiral Chaloner Ogle and returned to England, where he gave an accounting to the Admiralty. He learned that he had been elected MP for Ipswich. Vernon maintained his naval career for another four years before retiring in 1746. In an active Parliamentary career, Vernon advocated for improvements in naval procedures. He continued to hold an interest in naval affairs until his death in 1757.

News of the defeat at Cartagena was a significant factor in the downfall of the British Prime Minister Robert Walpole. [38] Walpole's anti-war views were considered by the Opposition to have contributed to his poor prosecution of the war effort. The new government under Lord Wilmington wanted to shift the focus of Britain's war effort away from the Americas and into the Mediterranean. Spanish policy, dictated by the queen Elisabeth Farnese of Parma, also shifted to a European focus, to recover lost Spanish possessions in Italy from the Austrians. In 1742, a large British fleet under Nicholas Haddock was sent to try and intercept a Spanish army being transported from Barcelona to Italy, which he failed to do having only 10 ships. [39] With the arrival of additional ships from Britain in February 1742, Haddock successfully blockaded the Spanish coast [40] failing to force the Spanish fleet into an action. Lawrence Washington survived the yellow fever outbreak, and eventually retired to Virginia. He named his estate Mount Vernon, in honour of his former commander.

Anson expedition Edit

The success of the Porto Bello operation led the British, in September 1740, to send a squadron under Commodore George Anson to attack Spain's possessions in the Pacific. Before they reached the Pacific, numerous men had died from disease, and they were in no shape to launch any sort of attack. [24] Anson reassembled his force in the Juan Fernández Islands, allowing them to recuperate before he moved up the Chilean coast, raiding the small town of Paita. He reached Acapulco too late to intercept the yearly Manila galleon, which had been one of the principal objectives of the expedition. He retreated across the Pacific, running into a storm that forced him to dock for repairs in Canton. After this he tried again the following year to intercept the Manila galleon. He accomplished this on 20 June 1743 off Cape Espiritu Santo, capturing more than a million gold coins. [39]

Anson sailed home, arriving in London more than three and a half years after he had set out, having circumnavigated the globe in the process. Less than a tenth of his forces had survived the expedition. Anson's achievements helped establish his name and wealth in Britain, leading to his appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty.

Florida Edit

In 1740, the inhabitants of Georgia launched an overland attack on the fortified city of St. Augustine in Florida, supported by a British naval blockade, but were repelled. The British forces led by James Oglethorpe, the Governor of Georgia, besieged St. Augustine for over a month before retreating, and abandoned their artillery in the process. The failure of the Royal Navy blockade to prevent supplies reaching the settlement was a crucial factor in the collapse of the siege. Oglethorpe began preparing Georgia for an expected Spanish assault. The Battle of Bloody Mose, where the Spanish and free black forces repelled Oglethorpe's forces at Fort Mose, was also a part of the War of Jenkins' Ear. [41]

French neutrality Edit

When war broke out in 1739, both Britain and Spain expected that France would join the war on the Spanish side. This played a large role in the tactical calculations of the British. If the Spanish and French were to operate together, they would have a superiority of ninety ships of the line. [42] In 1740, there was an invasion scare when it was believed that a French fleet at Brest and a Spanish fleet at Ferrol were about to combine and launch an invasion of England. [43] Although this proved not to be the case, the British kept the bulk of their naval and land forces in southern England to act as a deterrent.

Many in the British government were afraid to launch a major offensive against the Spanish, for fear that a major British victory would draw France into the war to protect the balance of power. [44]

Invasion of Georgia Edit

In 1742, the Spanish launched an attempt to seize the British colony of Georgia. Manuel de Montiano commanded 2,000 troops, who were landed on St Simons Island off the coast. General Oglethorpe rallied the local forces and defeated the Spanish regulars at Bloody Marsh and Gully Hole Creek, forcing them to withdraw. Border clashes between the colonies of Florida and Georgia continued for the next few years, but neither Spain nor Britain undertook offensive operations on the North American mainland.

Second attack on La Guaira (2 March 1743) Edit

The British attacked several locations in the Caribbean with little consequence to the geopolitical situation in the Atlantic. The weakened British forces under Vernon launched an attack against Cuba, landing in Guantánamo Bay with a plan to march the 45 miles to Santiago de Cuba and capture the city. [45] Vernon clashed with the army commander, and the expedition withdrew when faced with heavier Spanish opposition than expected. Vernon remained in the Caribbean until October 1742, before heading back to Britain he was replaced by admiral Chaloner Ogle, who took command of a sickly fleet. Less than half the sailors were fit for duty. The following year, a smaller fleet of Royal Navy led by commodore Charles Knowles raided the Venezuelan coast, on 2 March 1743 attacking newly La Guaira controlled by Royal Guipuzcoan Company of Caracas whose ships had rendered great assistance to the Spanish navy during War in carrying troops, arms, stores and ammunition from Spain to her colonies, and its destruction would be a severe blow both to the Company and the Spanish Crown.

After a fierce defence by Governor Gabriel José de Zuloaga's troops, Commodore Knowles, having suffered 97 killed and 308 wounded over three days, decided to retire west before sunrise on 6 March. He decided to attack nearby Puerto Cabello. Despite his orders to rendezvous at Borburata Keys—4 miles (6.4 km) east of Puerto Cabello—captains of the detached Burford, Norwich, Assistance, and Otter proceeded to Curaçao. The commodore angrily followed them in. On 28 March, he sent his smaller ships to cruise off Puerto Cabello, and once his main body had been refitted, went to sea again on 31 March. He struggled against contrary winds and currents for two weeks before finally diverting to the eastern tip of Santo Domingo by 19 April. [24]

Merger with wider war Edit

By mid-1742, the War of the Austrian Succession had broken out in Europe. Principally fought by Prussia and Austria over possession of Silesia, the war soon engulfed most of the major powers of Europe, who joined two competing alliances. The scale of this new war dwarfed any of the fighting in the Americas, and drew Britain and Spain's attention back to operations on the European continent. The return of Vernon's fleet in 1742 marked the end of major offensive operations in the War of Jenkins' Ear. France entered the war in 1744, emphasizing the European theatre and planning an ambitious invasion of Britain. While it ultimately failed, the threat persuaded British policymakers of the dangers of sending significant forces to the Americas which might be needed at home.

Britain did not attempt any additional attacks on Spanish possessions. In 1745, William Pepperrell of New England led a colonial expedition, supported by a British fleet under Commodore Peter Warren, against the French fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island off Canada. Pepperrell was knighted for his achievement, but Britain returned Louisbourg to the French by the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle in 1748. A decade later, during the Seven Years' War (known as the French and Indian War in the North American theatre), British forces under Lord Jeffrey Amherst and General Wolfe recaptured it. [46] [ pages needed ]

Privateering Edit

The war involved privateering by both sides. Anson captured a valuable Manila galleon, but this was more than offset by the numerous Spanish privateering attacks on British shipping along the transatlantic triangular trade route. They seized hundreds of British ships, looting their goods and slaves, and operated with virtual impunity in the West Indies they were also active in European waters. The Spanish convoys proved almost unstoppable. During the Austrian phase of the war, the British fleet attacked poorly protected French merchantmen instead.

Lisbon negotiations Edit

From August 1746, negotiations began in the city of Lisbon, in neutral Portugal, to try to arrange a peace settlement. The death of Philip V of Spain had brought his son Ferdinand VI to the throne, and he was more willing to be conciliatory over the issues of trade. However, because of their commitments to their Austrian allies, the British were unable to agree to Spanish demands for territory in Italy and talks broke down. [47]

The eventual diplomatic resolution formed part of the wider settlement of the War of the Austrian Succession by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle which restored the status quo ante. [48] British territorial and economic ambitions on the Caribbean had been repelled, [49] [50] [51] while Spain, though unprepared at the start of the war, proved successful in defending their American possessions. [52] Moreover, the war put an end to the British smuggling, and the Spanish fleet was able to dispatch three treasure convoys to Europe during the war and off-balance the British squadron at Jamaica. [53] The issue of the asiento was not mentioned in the treaty, as its importance had lessened for both nations. The issue was finally settled by the 1750 Treaty of Madrid in which Britain agreed to renounce its claim to the asiento in exchange for a payment of £100,000. The South Sea Company ceased its activity, though the treaty also allowed favourable conditions for British trade with Spanish America. [54]

George Anson's expedition to the Southeast Pacific led the Spanish authorities in Lima and Santiago to advance the position of the Spanish Empire in the area. Forts were thus built in the Juan Fernández Islands and the Chonos Archipelago in 1749 and 1750. [55]

Relations between Britain and Spain improved temporarily, in subsequent years, due to a concerted effort by the Duke of Newcastle to cultivate Spain as an ally. A succession of Anglophile ministers were appointed in Spain, including José de Carvajal and Ricardo Wall, all of whom were on good terms with British Ambassador Benjamin Keene, in an effort to avoid a repeat of hostilities. As a result, during the early part of the Seven Years' War between Britain and France, Spain remained neutral. However, it later joined the French and lost both Havana and Manila to the British in 1762, although both were returned as part of the peace settlement.

The War of Jenkins' Ear is commemorated annually on the last Saturday in May at Wormsloe Plantation in Savannah, Georgia.

Attention is also drawn to the following publications:

Emerick, Keith, Conserving and Managing Ancient Monuments: Heritage, Democracy and Inclusion (Woodbridge: The Boydell P., 2014 pp. 282. £60).

Lazarski, Christopher, Power Tends to Corrupt: Lord Acton’s Study of Liberty (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois U.P., 2012 pp. 324. $65).

Moran, Christopher R., and Murphy, Christopher J. (eds.), Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P., 2013 pp. 316. £70).

Thomas, Suzie, and Lea, Joanne (eds.), Public Participation in Archaeology (Woodbridge: The Boydell P., 2014 pp. 205. £60).

Curry-Machado, Jonathan, Global Histories, Imperial Commodities, Local Interactions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013 pp. 286. £60).

Della Casa, Giovanni, Galateo: The Rules of Polite Behaviour, ed. and tr. M.F. Rusnak (Chicago, IL: U. of Chicago P., 2013 pp. 103. $15).

Knapp, Andrew, and Footitt, Hilary (eds.), Liberal Democracies at War: Conflict and Representation (London: Bloomsbury, 2013 pp. 245. £19.99).