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Peace of Philocrates, 346 BC
The Peace of Philocrates (346 BC) ended the ten year long War of Amphipolis between Athens and Macedon, and helped establish Philip II of Macedon as a power in central and southern Greece. For the previous ten years two parallel wars had dominated Greece. In central Greece the Third Sacred War involved Phocis, Athens and Sparta on one side and Thebes, Boeotia and Thessaly on the other, and saw armies campaigning in Boeotia, Phocis and Thessaly. Further north Macedon and Athens had officially been at war since Philip attacked and captured Amphipolis, also claimed by Athens. The war had seen Athens form alliances with the Chalcidice League and various Thracian kings, but without achieving anything.
The Sacred War and the War for Amphipolis both ended in 346 BC, after some complex negotiations. Philip first sent out peace feelers in the summer of 347. After some careful investigations the Athenian politician Philocrates proposed that Philip should be invited to send peace envoys. This first prospect of peace quickly passed, and instead the Athenians sent out envoys to try and arrange an anti-Macedonian alliance. These efforts failed. Philip appears to have been motivated by a desire to create a stable settlement in Greece and an alliance with Athens that would allow him to concentrate on a campaign against the Persians in Asia Minor.
Meanwhile in Phocis the existing leader Phalaecus, had been deposed, and his successors offered to give Athens and Sparta the key fortresses that defended Thermopylae. The Athenians sent one expedition to the Chersonese to work with Cersobleptes, and prepared to send another to occupy Thermopylae. At the end of 347 the Athenians made another attempt to form an anti-Macedonian alliance, although this time they also included the possibility of a collective peace. They also asked Philip if he would release the prisoners captured at Olynthus.
Early in 346 news reached Athens that Phalaecus had been restored as leader at Phocis, and that Philip was willing to release the captives in return for peace. This convinced the Athenians to open peace negotiations, and ten envoys (including Demosthenes) were sent to Pella to meet with Philip. Philip offered fairly generous terms. He offered not to attack Athens's allies in the Chersonese during the peace negotiations, return the prisoners from Olynthus without a ransom, help the Athenians regain their position on Euboea, and repopulate Thespiae and Plataea (both destroyed by Thebes). In return Philip was to be free to deal with Phocis. In mid March the Athenian envoys left Pella to return home. Philip in turn moved east, and defeated Cersobleptes in eastern Thrace.
In April the negotiations moved to Athens, where Philip's envoys met the Athenian assembly. The Athenians debated two motions - one to wait until the envoys dispatched at the end of 347 had returned, the other to demand a Common Peace, open to all Greeks. Philip's senior envoy, Antipater, made it clear that this wasn't acceptable. Athens was now faced with simple choice - make peace on Philip's terms, or fight on almost alone. She decided to make peace, and even excluded Phocis and Cersobleptes from the peace treaty.
The Athenians now sent the same ten ambassadors back to Pella, where they had to wait for Philip to return from Thrace. Philip refused to let them go home without him, and instead made them accompany him as he marched south. Philip didn’t formally agree to the treaty until they had reached Pherae. By the time he was approaching Thermopylae it was too late for anyone to stop him. Demosthenes now broke from the other Athenian envoys and managed to get the Assembly to refuse Philip's call to supply troops for a possible clash with Thebes. Philip chose to abandon any plans for a military clash, and instead went for the peaceful route. Phaleacus, the Phocian leader, agreed to surrender Thermopylae to Philip and went into exile.
With their army gone, the Phocians had now choice other than to surrender. Philip didn’t want to punish them too harshly, and in particular wanted to keep them as a counter to Thebes. The Phocians did have to repay the money taken from Delphi, dismantle their towns and move back into villages, and lost their position on the Delphic Amphictyony, (taken by Philip). The peace settlement ended the Third Sacred War and the War for Amphipolis, but it also alienated Athens and Thebes. The Athenians felt that their allies in Phocis had been punished too harshly, and that their interests had not been served well by the peace treaty (few of the promised benefits had been delivered). Thebes, which had been Philip's ally in the Sacred War, no longer trusted Philip and began to suspect that he posed a threat to their city, and was also angry that Phocis hadn't been punished more severely.
After settling the two wars, Philip left a Thessalian garrison to watch Thermopylae, giving him easy access to central Greece. He also began to hint that his main aim was an expedition into Asia Minor
The peace in Greece didn't last too long. Demosthenes kept agitating against Philip, and Athens was one of a number of allies of Byzantium and Perinthus when they came under siege in the early 330s. This fight was soon overshadowed by the Fourth Sacred War or Amphissean War (339-338 BC), which saw Philip invade central Greece to punish Amphissa for sacrilege against the Delphic Oracle, but expanded into a wider war when Athens finally managed to gather an alliance against him. The war was ended by the crushing Macedonian victory at Chaeronea (August 338 BC), which established Philip II as the dominant power in all of Greece.
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Aeschines, (born 390 bc —died c. 314 bc ), Athenian orator who advocated peace with Philip II of Macedonia and who was a bitter political opponent of the statesman Demosthenes.
Aeschines was brought up in humble circumstances, and in the early part of his career he worked as a tragic actor and held minor posts in the state service. In 346 bc he, like Demosthenes, was a member of the embassies to Philip II that resulted in the peace of Philocrates between Athens and Macedonia. During the negotiations Aeschines had sought to reconcile the Athenians to Macedonia’s expansion into Greece, and consequently, after the peace had been concluded, Demosthenes and Timarchus prepared to prosecute him for treason. In retaliation Aeschines successfully indicted Timarchus for gross immorality, and at his own trial in 343 he was acquitted by a narrow majority.
In 339, by provoking the council of the Amphictyonic League to declare a sacred war against the town of Amphissa, in Locris, Aeschines gave Philip a pretext on which to enter central Greece as the champion of the Amphictyonic forces. The eventual result was the establishment of Macedonian hegemony over central Greece (including Athens) after the Battle of Chaeronea (338). The bitter hostility between Aeschines and Demosthenes worsened in the years that followed. In 336 Aeschines brought suit against a certain Ctesiphon for illegally proposing the award of a crown to Demosthenes in recognition of his services to Athens. The case, tried in 330, concluded with the overwhelming defeat of Aeschines, largely, no doubt, because of Demosthenes’ brilliant speech for Ctesiphon (“On the Crown”). Aeschines left Athens for Rhodes, where he is said to have taught rhetoric.
Three of his speeches are extant: (1) in accusation of Timarchus (2) in defense of his own conduct on the embassies to Philip and (3) in accusation of Ctesiphon. These appear to have been the only speeches he wrote, as opposed to those he delivered extempore. They show a tendency to forthright and forceful expression, free use of rhetorical figures, variety of sentence construction, fondness for poetical quotations, and ready wit.
Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece
Ian Worthington is one of the leading experts on Athenian and Macedonian history of the fourth century BC. 1 Thus his new monograph on Demosthenes, the famous Athenian politician and orator, is a most welcome addition to the extensive scholarly literature on this subject. Throughout the book readers will find a rich documentation of the literary (especially rhetorical, historical and biographical) and epigraphic ancient evidence though Worthington is less interested in numismatic and archaeological sources, he nevertheless provides the necessary references to scholarly literature. 2
While in almost every chapter the main focus is on Demosthenes, Worthington at the same time introduces his readers to the political system of Athenian democracy, to the rhetorical strategies of classical Greek orators before the assembly or in the courts, and to the history of the Greek states in the fourth century BC with a focus on Athenian and Macedonian relations in Demosthenes’ lifetime (384-322 BC). He addresses both specialists and interested non-specialists, for example on the rise of Macedon under Philip II in chapter 3 (Greece and the Awakening of Macedon, 42-70) and on the Athenian political and judicial system.
Worthington describes Demosthenes as a hero, but “a flawed one.” He proclaims as his literary aim “as well-rounded a portrait of Demosthenes as possible” (p. VII, see also his well-balanced concluding remarks, p. 339-341: “The best public actions in the cause of liberty and democracy?”). Worthington’s overall portrait turns out to be in several respects more critical towards Demosthenes’ politics and some features of his personal behaviour than, for instance, the recent study by Gustav Adolf Lehmann. 3
A preamble (p. 1-8) briefly discusses Demosthenes’ changing reputation as a ‘politician and hero’ in the general history of reception of his life and in earlier scholarship. Chapter 2 (p. 9-41) deals with Demosthenes’ early years, his family background, his education and the trials against the guardians. The next chapter (“Greece and the Awakening of Macedon,” p. 42-70) focuses on the background of fourth-century Greek history. The next three chapters treat Demosthenes as an aspiring politician in the first main period of his public career during the 350s and early 340s (p. 71-154). Chapters 7-10 (p. 155-254) discuss in great detail the main events and Demosthenes’ policies from the Peace of Philocrates in 346 BC (“an uneasy peace”) to Philip’s victory at Chaironeia (“the end of Greek freedom”). The next two chapters (p. 255-293) deal with the settlement in Greece of 338/337 BC and following years down to the famous Crown Trial in 330 BC which is treated separately in chapter 13 (p. 294-309). The last two chapters focus on Demosthenes’ last years to his death in 322 BC (p. 309-344).
Clearly, the core chapters in Worthington’s book deal with the years of Demosthenes’ political acme, that is roughly with the decade from the crisis of Olynthos to the battle of Chaironeia (349/48-338 BC). The second half of Demosthenes’ career (338-322 BC) is treated more briefly. Worthington maintains that under the reign of Alexander the Great Demosthenes was “far less politically active” than before (p. VIII) and that he followed a cautious course of behaviour and kept a “low profile” in politics (p. 285-291) after the destruction of Thebes in 335 BC and Alexander’s astonishing victories at Issos (in 333) and Gaugamela (in 331), while he was still active in the courts. Admittedly, our latest preserved assembly speech in the corpus about which there is no doubt as to Demosthenes as the orator is the fourth Philippika of 340 BC. But to conclude that this is evidence of Demosthenes’ alleged low profile in politics in the Lykourgan era is to ignore the impact of Demosthenes’ On the Crown on public opinion in Athens and Greece. In many respects this famous court speech was also was an extremely political speech (see Worthington p. 224-228 on the fourth Philippika and p. 294-309 on the Crown Trial). I would like to point also to the discussion about Dem. or. 17 On the Treaty with Alexander, a speech which may well express some Demosthenic opinions. Moreover, one should take into account that for educational or rhetorical purposes the ancient grammarians who collected Demosthenes’ speeches probably focused on the years before Chaironeia.
Apart from official propaganda, the reasons why Philip II attacked the Persian empire have remained unclear, and several plausible suggestions have been offered already both by ancient sources and by modern scholars. Worthington presumes as the main reason (p. 264-265) “the pressing need to acquire money because of his declining revenues.” I would add as a military consideration that after 338 BC and his decisive victory at Chaironeia the king faced the serious dilemma of either being forced to reduce his huge army or of finding a new area of military activity which promised easier victories and more booty than he might win in Thrace or in the Balkans. Isokrates and other counsellors had already suggested Asia Minor.
With regard to scholarly interest in Demosthenes, Worthington notes that in more recent history “the pendulum has swung the other way to focus on Demosthenes the rhetorician rather than the politician” (p. 344). Although Worthington clearly states that “this book is not about Demosthenes the orator” (p. IX), the author amply quotes from the speeches of the Demosthenic corpus and from orations of Demosthenes’ opponents such as Aischines as key sources. 4 He provides his readers with a brief introduction to Athenian deliberative and judicial oratory, too, and he avails himself of the opportunity to comment on the intricate problems of using these rhetorical sources as historical evidence. Worthington (p. 259-262) justly praises the Epitaphios (Funeral Oration Dem. or. 60) of 338/7 BC as “a fitting eulogy to those who died at Chaeronea” (262) and draws interesting comparisons to official commemoration speeches of more recent periods as pieces of historical evidence. 5
Two small quibbles. Worthington accepts the tradition that Demosthenes admired Perikles’ rhetorical style. In my view, however, this tradition may primarily result from Demosthenes’ admiration of the forcefulness of Perikles’ assembly speeches, while Demosthenes clearly differed especially in his ‘histrionic’ modern art of delivery from Perikles’ aristocratic and reserved style. Like earlier scholars, Worthington regards the well-known stories about Demosthenes’ strict training regimen as an orator mainly as inventions of later biographers and Athenian tourist guides (p. 38-41). 6 However, at least some of these stories may go back to almost contemporary and reliable Peripatetic authorities on Demosthenes as an orator, such as Theophrastos of Eresos and Demetrios of Phaleron, and hence in my view there may be some element of truth in them.
The additional material is helpful: 15 figures, four maps, a timetable of the period, a list of speech numbers and titles, and an index. In sum, I would strongly recommend this well-balanced, accessible and thorough monograph to scholars and non-specialist readers.
1. See, among his earlier contributions, Ian Worthington (ed.), Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, London 2000 idem, Philip II of Macedon, New Haven London 2008 idem / Joseph Roisman (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Oxford 2010. About 30 other papers of Worthington are listed in the bibliography of this present volume, p. 365-367.
2. Among his astute comments on coinage and money there is a misprint in the following telling comparison with regard to the relation of Athenian wages and contemporary bribes for politicians in the appendix on p. 344: “in 324 Demosthenes was accused of taking a bribe of twenty talents …, the equivalent of hiring (at two talents per day) 60,000 laborers for one day or one laborer for 165 years!” Read: “at two drachmas per day.”
3. Gustav Adolf Lehmann, Demosthenes von Athen. Ein Leben für die Freiheit, Munich 2004. To Worthington’s rich bibliography (p. 347-367) should be added two monographs: Iris Samotta, Demosthenes, Tübingen 2010 and, now, Wolfgang Will, Demosthenes, Darmstadt 2013. On the last two decades of Demosthenes’ career Will’s earlier book Athen und Alexander. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Stadt von 338-322 v. Chr., Munich 1983, is still worth consulting and should be added to the bibliography as well, and perhaps this reviewer may also mention one of his own studies Studien zur politischen Biographie des Hypereides. Athen in der Epoche der lykurgischen Reformen und des makedonischen Universalreiches, Munich 1993 2 , where Demosthenes’ politics between ca. 343 and 322 BC are also thoroughly treated.
4. Friedrich Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, Leipzig 1887-1898 2 repr. Hildesheim 1962, esp. vol. 3.1, in my view still remains essential reading on Demosthenes the orator. For more recent evaluations and many references to scholarly literature, Worthington rightly praises Lionel Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes, Meisenheim am Glan 1976, and now the masterly study of Douglas M. MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator, Oxford 2009.
5. Worthington states with reference to Dem. or. 20.141 (p. 259) that “everyone in the city … gathered in the Agora to hear” Demosthenes’ funeral oration. This passage from the speech Against Leptines, however, merely states that the Epitaphios Logos was a peculiar Athenian institution. The Agora as the site of delivery of Demosthenes’ oration is highly improbable, since we learn from Thucydides’ introduction to Perikles’ funeral oration (Thuc. 2.34.5-6), that those speeches usually were delivered from a temporary bema before the Dipylon Gate, which was located not far from the demosion sema in the Kerameikos.
6. See, for instance, Craig Cooper, “Philosophers, Politics, Academics: Demosthenes’ Rhetorical Reputation in Antiquity,” in: Ian Worthington (ed.), Demosthenes. Statesman and Orator, London 2000, 224-245, to whom Worthington refers.
On The Peace
of Thermopylae, sat in the venerable Amphictyonic Council, and presided at the Pythian Games, while Athens sulked. He sent envoys to complain that the Athenians had given shelter to Phocian exiles, and to invite them to recognize him as a member of the Amphictyonic Council. The democracy had veered round. This time it was Aeschines who was refused a hearing, and Demosthenes had to calm the indignation of the Assembly by pointing out that the peace was an accomplished fact, and that it would be suicidal to repudiate it now. The speech, which may be safely assigned to the autumn of 346, succeeded in its object, and peace was preserved with Philip for some six years more.
Start of the War (c. 355 BC) [ edit | edit source ]
Following the declaration of war against Phocis, Philomelos decided he would need to substantially increase the size of his army. Rather than levy the Phocian citizen body, Philomelos decided to hire more mercenaries the only way he could afford to do this was by plundering the dedications in the treasury of Apollo. ⎥] That the treasury contained much wealth, from years of accumulated donations, is well-established it is estimated that the Phocians spent some 10,000 talents of Apollo's treasure during the war. ⎥] In order to overcome the reluctance of mercenaries to fight for a sacrilegious cause, Philomelos increased the rate of pay by half, which allowed him to recruit a force of 10,000 troops over the winter, for the forthcoming war. ⎥]
Conflict in Epicnemidian Locris and Phocis (c. 355 BC) [ edit | edit source ]
Phocian, Boeotian and Thessalian campaigns in 355 BC
The following spring, possibly upon hearing news that the Boeotians were ready to march against Phocis, Philomelos took the initiative and marched into Epicnemidian Locris. ⎦] Since the Phocian army would be outnumbered by the whole Amphictyonic levy, it is probable that he sought to defeat his enemies one by one, starting with the Locrians. ⎦] If he could defeat the Locrians, then he was in a position to occupy the narrow pass of Thermopylae and block the union of the Thessalian and Boeotian armies, the main Amphictyonic contingents. ⎦] Philomelos's army thus crossed into Locris, probably using the Fontana pass from Triteis to Naryx, or possibly the Kleisoura pass from Tithronion to the same general area of Locris. The Locrians sent a force of cavalry to oppose him, which the Phocians easily defeated. ⎦] However, this battle gave the Thessalians time to pass through Thermopylae and arrive in Locris. Philomelos immediately attacked the Thessalians, and defeated them near the town of Argolas, whose location is not definitively known. Buckler suggests, on the basis of topographical considerations, that the modern village of Mendenitsa must be ancient Argolas. ⎦]
Philomelos then laid siege to Argolas, but failed to capture it, and instead pillaged as much Locrian territory as possible. ⎦] The Boeotian army, under the command of Pammenes, then arrived on the scene, and rather than oppose them, Philomelos backed off, allowing the Boeotians to link up with the Locrians and Thessalians. ⎦] Philomelos had thus failed in his strategy of dealing with the Amphictyons separately, and he now faced an army at least equal in size to his own. He therefore decided to retreat before the Amphictyons could bring him to battle, and probably using the Kleisoura pass, he returned with his army to Phocis. ⎦]
Battle of Neon [ edit | edit source ]
In response to Philomelos's retreat, Pammenes ordered the Amphictyonic force to cross into Phocis as well, probably by the Fontana pass, in order to prevent Philomelos marching on Boeotia. ⎧] The two armies converged on Tithorea (whose acropolis, Neon, gives the battle its name), where the Amphictyons brought the Phocians to battle. Details of the battle are scant, but the Amphictyons defeated the Phocians, and then pursued the survivors up the slopes of Mount Parnassos, slaying many. ⎧] Philomelos was injured, and rather than risk capture, threw himself off the mountain, falling to his death. ⎧] Onomarchos, who was second in command, managed to salvage the remainder of the army, and retreated to Delphi, whilst Pammenes retired to Thebes with the Boeotian army. ⎧]
The first Olympic games in 776 BC. The foundation of the city of Rome on April 21, 753 BC. The first Greek colony - Cumae is established northwest of Naples ca. 750 BC. Iliad and Odyssey are written by Homer about 750 BC. The First Messenian War ca. 743-724 BC. Syracuse is founded by Greek settlers from Corinth in 733 BC. Assyrians under Sargon II conquer the Kingdom of Israel about 722 BC. Niniveh is made capital of the Assyrian Empire in 705 BC.
700 - 600 BC
Destruction of the city of Babylon by Assyrians in 689 BC. Foundation of Japan by the legendary Emperor Jimmu on February 11, 660 BC. Assurbanipal destroys the Elamite capital Susa in 647 BC. The Neo-Babylonian Empire is established by Nabopolassar in 626 BC. The Draconian constitution ca. 624 BC. Collapse of the Assyrian Empire in 614 BC. Josiah, King of Judah is killed in the Battle of Megiddo in 609 BC. Babylonian ruler Nebuchadnezzar II defeats the Egyptians in the Battle of Carcemish ca. 605 BC. Lydia under Alyattes II (ca. 619-560 BC) becomes the leading power in Asia Minor. Emergence of Taoism in China.
600 - 500 BC
Marseille is founded by the Greek settlers about 600 BC. Ancient Greek poet Sappho dies about 600 BC. Solonian Constitution about 594/593 BC. Deportation of the Jews (known as the Babylonian captivity) by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 BC. The founder of Buddhism, Siddartha Gautama is born ca. 563 BC. Peloponnesian League about 550 BC. The Persian Empire is founded by Cyrus the Great about 550 BC. Greek philosopher Thales of Miletus dies ca. 547 BC. Cyrus the Great conquers the Neo-Babylonian Empire in 539 BC. The Greeks from Phocaea are defeated by the Carthaginians in the Battle of Alalia ca. 535 BC. Rome becomes a republic in 509 BC.
500 - 400 BC
Athenian democracy ca. 500 BC. Themistocles is elected archon in 493 BC. The citizens of Athens defeat the Persians in the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC. Darius I of Persia dies in 486 BC. The Persians led by Xerxes I defeat the Greek-city states under the command of Leonidas in the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC. The Greek-city states under the command of Themistocles decisively defeat the Persians in the Battle of Salamis in 480 BC. The founder of Confucianism, Chinese philosopher Confucius dies in 479 BC. Xerxes I of Persia is murdered in 465 BC. Beginning of the First Peloponnesian War in 457 BC. Peace of Callias ends the Persian Wars in 440 BC. Pericles is elected strategos of Athens in 440 BC. Construction of Parthenon in Athens is completed in 432 BC. Beginning of the Second Peloponnesian War in 431 BC. Greek historian Herodotus dies in 430 BC. Ancient Greek writer Sophocles dies ca. 406 BC. The Peloponnesian Wars end with surrender of Athens in 404 BC.
400 - 300 BC
Socrates is sentenced to death in 399 BC. Roman dictator Marcus Furius Camillus captures the Etruscan city of Veii. Ancient Greek comic poet Aristophanes dies in 385 BC. Ancient Greek physician Hippocrates dies ca. 370 BC. Greek philosopher Plato dies ca. 348 BC. Peace of Philocrates ends the war between Athens and the Kingdom of Macedon in 346 BC. Artaxerxes III of Persia conquers Egypt in 343 BC. The Romans defeat the Latin League in the Latin War in 340 BC. Philip of Macedon defeats Athens and its allies in the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC. Philip of Macedon is murdered in 336 BC and is succeeded by his Alexander III of Macedon commonly known as Alexander the Great. Alexander the Great launches his expedition against the Persian Empire in 334 BC capturing Syria, Tyre, Jerusalem, Egypt and Persian Empire by 330 BC. Alexander's army refuses to continue the march eastward at the Hyphasis River, India in 325 BC. Alexander the Great dies in Babylon without an heir on June 13, 323 BC. Establishment of the Maurya Empire in 322 BC. Alexander's generals Ptolemy, Cassander, Lysimachus and Seleucus divide the Empire of Alexander the Great among themselves in 321 BC.
Third Sacred War
The Third Sacred War was the last great internecine conflict of the classical Greeks, the culmination of continuously series of wars that began as early as 465 BC, only to be ended by Philip of Macedonia in 346 BC.
In the twenty years after the mutually disastrous battle of Mantinea, the leaderless, Greek city-states further exhausted themselves in continued and confused civil warfare.
The so-called Social War (357- 55 BC) or ‘War of the Allies’ of Athens, only weakened the Athenian fleet.
From small beginning, this war threatened to involve all of Greece. Thebans and other Thessalonians in the Amphictyonic League charged their ancient enemy Phocis with cultivating lands sacred to Apollo.
Phocis was fined as was (belatedly) Sparta for its seizure in 382 of the Cadmea at Thebes. Under Philomelus, Phocis refused to pay it armed, captured the Delphic shrine and its treasury in 355. The Phocians had taken possession of the sanctuary and were meting down the offerings and the contents of the treasury for their military expenses and the service of the oracle had been almost suspended.
Thebes declared war in 355, defeating Philomelus at Neon in 354 and causing a Phocian retreat in 353. Philip helped Thebes conquer Phocis from 351 to 347, seeking peace with Athens at the same time.
The Third Sacred War lasted until 346 BC, where King Philip II of Macedonia gained control of Delphi. The war was concluded with Peace of Philocrates and Philip II became the chairman of the Amphictyonic League.
Third Sacred War
The Second Athenian League
By the treaty which ended the Peloponnesian War Athens lost all its overseas possessions, had its navy limited to twelve ships, and became a subordinate ally of Sparta, bound to follow Sparta&rsquos lead in foreign policy (cf. p. 159). Accordingly it contributed to Sparta&rsquos war against Elis c. 401 (Xen. Hell. III. ii. 25) and to Thibron&rsquos expedition to Asia Minor in 400 (Xen. Hell. III. i. 4: sending oligarchic cavalrymen Athens was glad to be rid of). But it is not long before we find moves towards an independent policy. Arms and officers were sent to the Persian fleet being assembled under Conon&rsquos command, and in 397 envoys were sent to the Persian King, but were caught by the Spartans and executed (Hell. Oxy. 10. i
Harding 11. A). In 396 Athens refused to contribute to Agesilaus&rsquo expedition (Paus. III. 9. ii-iii). Demaenetus with the secret backing of the council and of democratic leaders set out with a trireme to join Conon: when he was discovered and reported to the Spartans, the council panicked and pretended to know nothing, but he got away
In 395 Athens was drawn into the Corinthian War fairly readily (and Thrasybulus, opposed to war in 396, was ready for war now: Hell. Oxy. 9. ii, contr. Xen. Hell. III. v. 16). Xenophon&rsquos Theban speech in Athens accepts that Athens wants to recover its empire Sparta is unpopular in the Peloponnese and has deceived those whom it liberated from Athens Athens could now become more powerful than ever (Xen. Hell. III. v. 8&ndash15). Athens had started rebuilding the Piraeus walls by 395/4, before Cnidus (IG ii 2 1656&ndash7 = R&O 9) work on them and the long walls was helped by the money which Conon brought in 393 (Xen. Hell. IV. viii. 9&ndash10, Diod. Sic. XIV. 85. ii-iii), and the mercenary force at Corinth was commanded by Athenians, first Iphicrates and, after he unsuccessfully tried to seize Corinth for Athens, Chabrias (Androtion FGrH 324 F 48 = Philoch. FGrH328 F 150
Harding 22. A Xen. Hell. IV viii. 34, Diod. Sic. XIV 92. ii). Cnidus and its aftermath, though in fact a victory of Athens&rsquo traditional enemy, Persia, were treated as a Greek and an Athenian success (cf. p. 244), so extravagantly that Conon became the first living Athenian to be honoured with a statue in the agora (Dem. XX. Leptines 68&ndash70) Athens also honoured Evagoras of Salamis, likewise associated with Cnidus (R&O 11), Dionysius of Syracuse, whom Conon hoped to detach from Sparta (IG ii 2 18 = R&O 10
Harding 20, Lys. XIX. Property of Aristophanes19&ndash20 cf. p. 320) and others, and Conon was honoured in Erythrae (IK Erythrai und Klazomenai 6 = R&O 8
By 392 Athens had begun to rebuild its navy, and had regained the north Aegean islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, protecting the route from the Hellespont to Athens, which it had possessed for most of the fifth century (cf. Xen. Hell. TV. viii. 15, Andoc. III.Peace 12). It had also regained Delos (independent shortly after the war, /. Delos 87 = R&O 3 administered by Athenian and probably Andrian amphictyons 393/2-389/8, /. Delos 97). The first peace proposals in 392 would have deprived it of all overseas possessions once more the second in 392/1 made an exception of the northern islands but not of Delos Andocides&rsquo speech on that occasion suggests that some Athenians were hankering after more (Andoc. III. Peace 15). In any case the Athenians were not yet ready to agree to a treaty which would abandon the Asiatic Greeks (cf. p. 228). Sparta returned to the Aegean in 391, and Athens&rsquo support for Evagoras when Persia had begun to regard him as a rebel caused embarrassment on all sides but in 390 Thrasybulus had a remarkable campaign. He was sent to support the democrats in Rhodes but he went first to the Hellespont, where he mediated between two Thracian rulers and made both allies of Athens he restored the democracy in Byzantium, made an alliance with Calchedon and imposed a 10 per cent tax on trade passing through the Bosporus (cf. Dem. XX. Leptines 60) he defeated a Spartan harmost on Lesbos there are traces of his activity in various other places in the islands and on the mainland he imposed a general 5 per cent tax, and claimed the right to exile men from the territory of Athens and its allies (IG ii 2 24/28 = R&O -718
Harding 25/26). He finally reached Rhodes, but early the next year he was killed on a fund-raising expedition to Aspendus, on the south coast of Asia Minor (Xen. Hell. IV. viii. 25&ndash30, Diod. Sic. XIV. 94, 99. iv-v). By then he had been ordered back to Athens, and his colleague Ergocles was charged with embezzlement (Lys. XXVIII. Ergocles, XXIX. Philocrates).His successor Agyrrhius did little, but Iphicrates, sent to the Hellespont, defeated and killed the Spartan Anaxibius at Abydus (Xen. Hell IV. viii. 31&ndash9).
In 387 Iphicrates and Diotimus blockaded the Spartan Nicolochus in Abydus, but Antalcidas rescued him by a trick, captured a further Athenian squadron coming from Thrace, and so regained control of the Hellespont (Xen. Hell.
V. i. 6&ndash7, 25&ndash8). Athenian recriminations are revealed by a decree honouring Phanocritus of Parium: the original proposal, which was presumably bland, does not survive, but an amendment makes it clear that Phanocritus had given information about the enemy ships which the generals had disbelieved (IG ii 2 29 = R&O 19). The Athenians did not lose hope: inscriptions show Athens giving reassurances to Erythrae &lsquoabout not giving up Erythrae to the barbarians&rsquo, and deciding not to send a garrison and governor to Clazomenae as long as it paid Thrasybulus&rsquo 5 per cent tax (SEGxxvi 1282//G ii 2 28 = R&O 17/18
Harding 28/26). But when Antalcidas again offered a common peace treaty the Athenians and the other Greeks had to accept it: the Asiatic Greeks were surrendered to Persia Athens&rsquo three northern islands were the only exceptions to the autonomy rule, so it lost Delos once more and Sparta proceeded to interpret the autonomy rule in its own interests. Athens had, nevertheless, made a very rapid and convincing recovery from its defeat in the Peloponnesian War.
The Foundation of the Second Athenian League
The abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, to which Sparta had committed itself in 412&ndash411, had at last taken place, and was seen as a great betrayal. In Aristophanes, as early as Peace (421), we can find the idea that while the Greeks quarrel among themselves they are exposing themselves to the possibility of an attack by Persia (Peace 105&ndash8, 406&ndash8, Lys. 1128&ndash35). Gorgias in his Olympic Speech, best dated 408, and his Funeral Speech, of unknown date, had claimed that the Greeks ought to fight against the barbarians, not against one another (82 A 1. iv-v DK). Lysias&rsquo (XXXIII)Olympic Speech is dated 388 by Diodorus (XrV. 109. iii) but more probably belongs to 384: it appears to be complaining of the situation after the King&rsquos Peace, when some Greeks were subject to Persia and others to the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse, and calling on Sparta to lead the Greeks in reasserting their freedom. Isocrates in his (IV) Panegyric, c.380, contrasted the glories of the alleged fifth-century Peace of Callias (cf. pp. 53&ndash4) with the humiliation of the Peace of Antalcidas (§§117-20) and, while nominally pleading for Athens and Sparta to be reconciled and to cooperate against Persia (§§16-17), went on to defend Athens&rsquo fifth-century empire (§§ 100&ndash6) and to claim that Athens should lead the Greeks against Persia once more (cf. his later summary, XV. Antid. 57&ndash62 another condemnation of the Peace XII. Panath. 106).
But in the years after 386 the peace and Sparta&rsquos interpretation of it were facts to be lived with. In 386/5 the Thracian Hebryzelmis was praised but not granted an alliance (IG ii 2 31 = Tod 117
Harding 29). In 385 Athens was afraid to help Mantinea against Sparta, though it did take in refugees afterwards (Diod. Sic. XV. 5.v,IG ii 2 33. 7&ndash8). In 382 there was talk of an alliance with Olynthus when that was threatened by Sparta (Xen. Hell. V. ii. 15), but none seems to have been made refugees were taken in once more, from Thebes when that was occupied by Sparta (Xen. Hell. V. ii. 31, Plut. Pel. 6. iii-v). But Chios, Mytilene and Byzantium maintained their connection with Athens (Isoc. XIV Plataic 26&ndash7), and in 384/3 Athens found a solution appropriate to the new circumstances: a defensive alliance with Chios was made, on the basis of freedom and autonomy and within the framework of the King&rsquos Peace (IG ii 2 34&ndash5 = R&O 20
In 379/8 theTheban exiles set out from Athens to overthrow the pro-Spartan regime (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 2, Diod. Sic. XV 25. i, Plut. Pel. 7&ndash12), and they received military support from Athens - apparently unofficial according to Xenophon, official according to Diodorus and others perhaps forces were sent officially to the border and on their own initiative entered Boeotia (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 9 Diod. Sic. XV 25. iv-26, cf. Din. I. Demosthenes 38&ndash9, Aristid. I. Panathenaic 294). When Cleombrotus took a Spartan army he had to go via Plataea since Chabrias was blocking the route through Attica (Xen. Hell. V. i. 14).When Sparta protested, Athens panicked and condemned the generals who had gone to Boeotia (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 19, cf. 22, Plut. Pel. 14. i omitted by Diod. Sic). It was while Spartan envoys were in Athens that Sphodrias invaded Attica from Thespiae Athens protested but the Spartans acquitted him and Athens then came out openly in opposition to Sparta (cf. p. 249).
Xenophon reports that the Athenians put gates on the Piraeus, and proceeded to build ships and support the Boeotians enthusiastically (Hell. V. iv. 34), but he does not directly mention the Second Athenian League. Diodorus has an account (XV 28&ndash9) which dovetails well with an important series of inscriptions. After Cleombrotus&rsquo winter expedition (27. iii) the Boeotians united in an alliance [perhaps the first move towards the revival of the federation], and Athens sent envoys to the states under Sparta&rsquos control, inviting them to assert their common freedom. This met with considerable success, first with Chios and Byzantium, then with Rhodes, Mytilene and others. Excited at the good will of the allies, Athens established a council (synedrion) of allies, to meet in Athens, each member having one vote, the members to be autonomous and Athens to be the leader(hegemon). Sparta tried to discourage cities from joining, and prepared for a hard war (28). After a digression on Persia&rsquos current attempt to recover Egypt (29. i-iv), Diodorus continues with the episode of Sphodrias, whom he calls Sphodriades, and which he is probably wrong to place here rather than before the creation of the League the Athenians voted that Sparta was in breach of the peace and decided to go to war they admitted Thebes to the synedrion on the same terms as the other members and they voted to give up existing cleruchies and forbade Athenians to farm land outside Attica (29. v-viii).
In the epigraphic record the first stage is the alliance of 384/3 with Chios, which was used as a model for the League. Next Byzantium is made an ally of Athens and the other allies, on the same terms as Chios (IG ii 2 41 = Tod 121
Harding 34). A later stage is represented by a decree for Methymna, on Lesbos, which is already an ally of Athens and now has its alliance extended to the other allies the synedrion now exists and is involved in the oath-taking, and Methymna is to be added to an already existing list of allies(IG ii 2 42 = R&O 23
Harding 37 for adding to the list cf. below). A very fragmentary inscription contains an amendment to a decree concerning Thebes, and mentions men from Chios and Mytilene (IG ii 2 40 trans, of a speculative reconstruction Harding 33).
We also have an inscription of spring 378/7 which embodies a prospectus for the League, setting out not its organisation (the existence of the synedrion is taken for granted) but its aim and the terms on which states are invited to join, followed by a list of members(IG ii 2 43 = R&O 22
Harding 35: see ill. 18 and box). The aim of the League is, &lsquoSo that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in security, [[and so that the peace and friendship sworn by the Greeks and the King may be in force and endure in accordance with the agreements]]&rsquo (11. 9&ndash15 for the later erasure of the bracketed clause see p. 272). An invitation is extended to Greeks and barbarians outside the King&rsquos domain to join, subject to various promises: they are to be free and autonomous, with whatever constitution they wish, not subjected to a governor or garrison or to the payment of tribute, on the same terms as Chios, Thebes and the other allies (11. 15&ndash25). All properly publicly or privately owned by Athenians in allied territory will be renounced all stelai (inscribed stones) at Athens unfavourable to any allies will be demolished from 378/7 it will be illegal for Athenians publicly or privately to own property in allied territory, and charges in connection with this are to be laid before the synedrion (11. 25&ndash46).The alliance is to be a defensive alliance (11. 46&ndash51). After a clause providing for the publication of the decree with a list of members (11. 63&ndash72), the decree ends with the appointment of envoys to go to Thebes [possibly to persuade the Thebans to join as Thebans, not as Boeotians] (11. 73&ndash7).
For the good fortune of the Athenians and of the allies of the Athenians. So that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in security, [[and so that the peace and the friendship sworn by the Greeks and the King may be in force and endure in accordance with the agreements]], be it decreed by the people:
If any of the Greeks or of the barbarians living in Europe or of the islanders, who are not the King&rsquos, wishes to be an ally of the Athenians and their allies, he may be - being free and autonomous, being governed under whatever form of constitution he wishes, neither receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor nor paying tribute, on the same terms as the Chians and the Thebans and the other allies. (IG ii 2 43, 7&ndash25: bracketed clause later erased)
III. 18 The prospectus of the Second Athenian League, inv. no. EM10397. Epigraphical Museum, Athens/ Hellenic Ministry of Culture, Archaeological Receipts Fund
The promises are promises that Athens will not treat this League as it had treated the Delian League, and they also serve to spell out what freedom and autonomy are to mean in practical terms. The model is now not just Chios but Chios and Thebes, which suggests that these specific promises may have been added at the point when Thebes joined. The promise about Athenian-owned properly is separate from the original list, and also appears at a later point in Diodorus&rsquo account, so it should be seen as an addition to the original scheme: it applies only to states which join the League as free and autonomous allies, and therefore not to Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros (which had been recognised as Athenian possessions in the King&rsquos Peace). It is not in fact likely that there was much Athenian-owned properly elsewhere at this date, or that there were many stelai unfavourable to potential allies: these clauses indicate that the decks will be completely cleared, not that there is much clearing to be done.
The list of members was inscribed in instalments by different hands. It begins below the original decree below that part of the list there survives the beginning of another decree the list continues on the left-hand side of the stele. Inscribed in the same hand as the original decree, presumably at the same time, are Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, Byzantium and, heading a second column, Thebes (i. 79&ndash83, ii. 79): these were still the only members in the spring of 377. (The decree for Methymna, mentioned above, provided for Methymna to be added to an already existing list: perhaps Methymna joined after the general decree had been enacted but before it was inscribed.) The remaining batches of names will be considered below when we look at the development of the League. Diodorus claims that seventy members joined (XV. 30. ii) Aeschines claims that seventy-five were lost in the Social War of the 350&rsquos (Aeschin. II. Embassy 70) there were fifty-three or slightly more in the inscribed list. Despite the League&rsquos declared purpose, most of the members were states not seriously threatened by Sparta in the 370&rsquos.
The structure of this League was different from that of the Delian League (cf. p. 20). Probably (until 454/3, when the council was abandoned) the Delian League had a council in which Athens had one vote along with each of the allies. This League had asynedrion permanently in Athens, of which Athens was almost certainly not a member, with its own presidential apparatus (a Theban president in R&O 29). For League matters, the synedrion and the Athenian council both acted as probouleutic bodies, and the Athenian assembly took the final decision, but presumably could not commit the allies to a decision they had said they would not accept. Thus Athens&rsquo two decrees of 368 for Dionysius of Syracuse (IG ii 2 103/105 + 223 = R&O 33/34
Harding -752: cf. p. 272) show the council sending a recommendation directly to the assembly on an Athenian matter but asking the opinion of the synedrion &lsquoabout the building of the temple [at Delphi] and the peace&rsquo, which must cover the question of admitting Dionysius to the League and the synedrion must have refused to have Dionysius as a member, since the second decree makes a bilateral alliance between Dionysius and Athens. In a decree of 362/1 (IG i 2 112 = R&O 41
Harding 56) the synedrion took the initiative in accepting an alliance with Peloponnesian states, it passed its recommendation to the council and the council passed it to the assembly. We shall see that, at different stages in the negotiation of the Peace of Philocrates between Athens and Philip in 346, the synedrion put forward recommendations but by then it was a weak body, and it also said it would accept whatever Athens decided (cf. pp. 277, 348). At the end of 373/2 the synedrion imposed a settlement after a civil war in Paros, and Athens required Paros to send offerings to festivals as a colony (R&O 29).
We do not hear of any trials of the kinds provided for - by the synedrion if Athenians were accused of owning property in allied territory, by Athens and the allies [perhaps in these cases the synedrion would have been invited to confirm an Athenian verdict] if anybody [apparently any Athenian] was accused of trying to overturn the arrangements for the League. The first procedure envisages a common fund of the allies, to benefit from confiscations. On the other hand, the promise not to collect tribute, repeated in decrees for some individual allies, makes it hard to believe that there were regular financial levies from the beginning presumably the assumption was that allied states would provide and pay for their own forces. There may have been some voluntary fund-raising: in 375 there is a complaint that the Thebans were not providing money for a naval campaign which they had instigated (Xen. Hell. VI. ii. 1, cf. V. iv. 62). There were financial problems in 373 (cf. below), and it may have been at that point that the decision was taken to collect money after all, but to call the payments not phoros, &lsquotribute&rsquo, but syntaxeis, &lsquocontributions&rsquo ([Dem.] XLIX. Timotheus49, Theopompus FGrH 115 F 98
Harding 36). Evidence for sums collected is scanty and late: totals of 45 talents in the late 350&rsquos, 60 talents c.347 (Dem. XVIII. Crown 234, Aeschin. II. Embassy 71) and 5 talents each from Eretria and Oreus in the late 340&rsquos (Aeschin. III. Ctesiphon 94, 100). The synedrion seems to have approved both assessments and expenditure (IG ii 2 233 = R&O 72
Harding 97. 27&ndash8 IG ii 2 123 = R&O 52
Harding 69. 9&ndash11). &lsquoThe men elected by the people to exact from the islanders the money that they owe&rsquo (IG ii 2 111 = R&O 39
Harding 55. 12&ndash14) were perhaps men appointed to collect arrears of syntaxeis. It does not look as if there was ever a likelihood that the syntaxeis would become a means of Athenian oppression.
The Development of the League: To Leuctra
The second batch in the League&rsquos list of members (ii. 80&ndash4) comprises the cities of Euboea other than Histiaea/Oreus, and nearby Icus: these are the first additions mentioned by Diodorus (XV 30. i), and we have a decree for the admission of Chalcis, still in 378/7(IG ii 2 44 = Tod 124
Harding 38). In the summer of 377 Chabrias attacked Histiaea but did not capture it (cf. p. 286 force could be used against states reluctant to join), and then recruited members elsewhere in the Aegean, including Peparethus and Sciathus (Diod. Sic. XV 30. ii-v on the stele i. 85&ndash9, including Peparethus and Sciathus). 376 was the year in which a Spartan blockade threatened Athens&rsquo corn supply but Chabrias with an Athenian fleet escorted the corn ships and then besieged Naxos and defeated the Spartans (Xen. Hell V iv. 60&ndash1, Diod. Sic. XV. 34. iii-35. ii): perhaps all the remaining members on the front of the stele joined this year. His victory was the first major Athenian naval success since the Peloponnesian War, and he was honoured with a statue in the agora (Aeschin. III. Ctesiphon 243, Arist. Rh. III. 1411 B 6&ndash7, Nep. XII. Chab. 1. iii) a surviving statue base (Hesp. xxx 1961, 74&ndash91) records honours awarded by various bodies resulting from his campaigns of 376 and 375.
Probably the first entry on the left-hand side of the stele is 11. 131&ndash4, level with the beginning of the list on the front, and some distance below the other entries: &lsquoThe People of Zacynthus in Nellus&rsquo.This must be connected in some way with Timotheus&rsquo campaign of 375, possibly the beginning rather than the end. At the top of the left-hand side (11. 97&ndash8) the best restoration is: &lsquoThe People of Pyrrha&rsquo, on Lesbos, known to be a member but not listed elsewhere. Next come Abdera and other places in the north-east (11. 99&ndash105: Olynthus is included, as &lsquoThe Chalcidians from Thrace&rsquo: cf. ill. 19). These will result from a campaign of Chabrias in 375, when he defended Abdera against a Thracian attack, installed a garrison (breaking one of the League&rsquos promises, however virtuously), and, despite an error in Diodorus&rsquo text, was not murdered (Diod. Sic. XV. 36. i-iv). Prompted by the Thebans, Conon&rsquos son Timotheus campaigned in the west: of his gains Xenophon mentions Corcyra, Diodorus mentions Cephallenia, Acarnania and king Alcetas of the Molossi he defeated the Spartans off Alyzia opposite Leucas, after which the King&rsquos Peace was renewed, and he was recalled to Athens but restored exiles in Zacynthus on his way home (Xen. Hell. V iv. 62&ndash6, Diod. Sic. XV 36. v-vi). Acarnania, one city of Cephallenia, and Alcetas and his son Neoptolemus appear on the stele (11. 106&ndash10 we do not know what name has been erased in 1. Ill, but the frequent guess that it was Jason of Pherae is insecure: cf. p. 286), but not Corcyra or the other cities of Cephallenia separate inscriptions provide for the admission of Corcyra, Acarnania and Cephallenia (IG ii 2 96 = R&O 24
Harding 41, dated 375/4) and record the admission of Corcyra (IG ii 2 97 = Tod 127
Harding 42) and arrangements with Cephallenia including reference to a garrison (Agora xvi 46).The most likely explanation is that proceedings were interrupted by the renewal of the King&rsquos Peace and the recall of Timotheus to Athens, then further delayed by the renewed fighting in the west, and not completed until the end of that fighting in 372 (cf. below). Timotheus like Chabrias was honoured with a statue in the agora (Aeschin. III. Ctesiphon 243, Nep XIII. Timoth. 2. iii). He and Conon were honoured in other places too, and texts referring to him and the year 375/4 have been read on the base of the &lsquodancing girls&rsquo column north-east of the temple of Apollo at Delphi (cf. SEG xxxiii 440).
Ill. 19 &lsquoChalcidians&rsquo: coin showing that name still in use after 379. Hirmer Verlag, Munich
Other names on the stele (11. 112&ndash30) are from the Aegean certainly none is later than 373 and probably none is later than 375. This batch begins with Andros: Delos was presumably made independent of Athens under the Peace of Antalcidas (cf. p. 263), but Athenian amphictyons are attested there again from 377/6, and they are joined by Andrians from 374/3 (/. Delos 98 = R&O 28). There was room on the stele for further names but, for whatever reason, although the League continued to grow (cf. Xen. Hell. VI. ii. 11&ndash13, Diod. Sic. XV. 47. ii-iii, on Timotheus&rsquo activity in the Aegean in 373), further names were not added to the list.
When Timotheus, on his way back to Athens, restored exiles in Zacynthus, Sparta protested. In 374 Sparta sent expeditions to Zacynthus and to Corcyra in 373 it sent a further sixty ships under Mnasippus to Corcyra, and he ravaged the countryside and blockaded the city. Timotheus delayed in coming from Athens, because of difficulties in raising men and money in the Aegean, and it was perhaps in response to these difficulties that the levying of syntaxeis was introduced (cf. p. 268). He was deposed and put on trial (cf. [Dem.] XLIX. Timotheus 6&ndash24, naming Callistratus and Iphicrates as prosecutors and saying that Alcetas and Jason spoke in his defence Diodorus wrongly has him reinstated). Ctesicles went over land in winter 373/2 and enabled the Corcyraeans to defeat and kill Mnasippus Iphicrates arrived by sea in 372, pausing in Cephallenia when he knew that Mnasippus was dead he arrived in time to defeat a Syracusan squadron sent to support Sparta, and then hired out his sailors to work on the land in Corcyra and himself and his soldiers to fight for the Acarnanians. In 371 he collected money in Cephallenia and was preparing to attack Laconia when he was overtaken by the next peace treaty (Xen. Hell. VI. ii. 2&ndash39, Diod. Sic. XV 45&ndash46. iii, 47. i-vii). Before the campaign of 373/2 Diodorus has a chapter on Iphicrates&rsquo military innovations, crediting him in particular with converting hoplites into peltasts by giving them the lightThracian shield, the pelte, lengthening their swords and spears and devising the Iphicratid boot (cf. the Wellington boot of the nineteenth century AD) (Diod. Sic. XV 44, cf. Nep. XL Iph. 1. iii-iv): apart from the boot, there is no other indication that hoplite equipment was changed in these ways, and if there is any truth behind the report it may refer to an experiment with the mercenaries whom Iphicrates had been commanding in Egypt.
Thebes was becoming an increasingly embarrassing member of the League. It provided ships forTimotheus in 373 ([Dem.] XLIX. Timotheus 14&ndash16), and a president for the synedrion on the last day of 373/2 (R&O 29) but it destroyed Plataea, refounded after the Peace of Antalcidas, in 373/2 and put increasing pressure on Thespiae (cf. p. 285). The peace of summer 371 resulted from an approach by Athens to Sparta when Callistratus argued that Athens and Sparta ought to be on the same side, and Thebes was excluded from the treaty (cf. p. 232). That was followed by Thebes&rsquo defeat of Sparta at Leuctra, a battle in which Athens was not involved.
The Development of the League: From Leuctra to the Social War
The Thebans announced their victory at Leuctra to their Athenian allies, but the herald was received with a stony silence (Xen. Hell. VI. iv. 19&ndash20). The peace treaty of autumn 371 was organised by Athens: it included Sparta and excluded Thebes it was based on &lsquothe decrees of the Athenians and their allies&rsquo [i.e. freedom and autonomy were to be understood as in the League] its territorial basis was probably echein ta heauton, that states should possess what belonged to them, which Athens was to exploit in the years that followed (cf. pp. 232&ndash3).The aim of the League, &lsquoSo that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in security&rsquo, had been accomplished by Thebes&rsquo defeat of Sparta - Sparta would not after this be a threat to the freedom and autonomy of the Greeks - but, as Athens did not disband the Delian League when it gave up regular warfare against Persia in the middle of the fifth century (cf. pp. 53&ndash6), it did not now disband the Second League. However, it was increasingly to pursue policies which the League&rsquos members could not join in supporting.
Thebes must now have ceased to be a member of the League, as did the other central Greek members, which adhered to Thebes rather than to Athens. It was now in Athens&rsquo interests to support not Thebes but Sparta, so in 370 Athens rejected the appeal from Arcadia and its allies (Diod. Sic. XV. 62. iii later denounced as a bad decision by Dem. XVI. Megalopolitans 12, 19), and in winter 370/69 sent Iphicrates to attack the Thebans on their homeward journey - which he did ineffectively: some Athenians were slower than others to recognise the new reality (Xen. Hell. VI. v. 49&ndash52: cf. pp. 307&ndash8). In 369 a firm alliance was made between Athens and Sparta, but anachronistic fear led to the decision that the command should alternate between the two every five days, not be given to Athens at sea and Sparta on land (Xen. Hell. VII. i. 1&ndash14, Diod. Sic. XV 67. i: cf. p. 308). When the Thebans returned to the Peloponnese, Chabrias was effective in fighting against them (Diod. Sic. XV 69). We learn from an inscription that in 369/8 envoys went to Athens from Mytilene, anxious about the new policy: the leading politician Callistratus was responsible for the reply, that when Sparta broke the treaties and threatened the Greeks Athens called on the Greeks to join in resisting, but&hellip [and frus-tratingly the rest of the text is lost] (IG ii 2 107 = R&O 31
Harding 53. 35 sqq.). Now that Athens and Sparta were on the same side, Athens made an alliance with Dionysius of Syracuse, but it appears that the synedrion refused to have him as a member of the League (IG ii 2 103/105 + 223 = R&O 33/34
To add to the allies&rsquo discomfiture, Athens began to exploit the echein ta heauton clause in the peace to attempt to recover former possessions in the north-east: Amphipolis, which it had lost to the Spartans in 424/3 and should have recovered under the Peace of Nicias in 421 but did not (cf. pp. 117&ndash18, 120), was a matter of pride as well as economic advantage the Chersonese, on the European side of the Hellespont, through which the corn ships sailed from the Black Sea to Athens, was an area in which Athens had been interested since the sixth century. In the hinterland was the Odrysian kingdom of Thrace, with which Athens was always anxious to maintain a good relationship: Hebryzelmis was succeeded by Cotys in 383/2 at some date he was made an Athenian citizen, and c.386 Iphicrates married his sister (Dem. XXIII. Aristocrates 118, 129).
In 368 Iphicrates was sent against Amphipolis: he at first supported one claimant to the Macedonian throne, Ptolemy, against his rival Pausanias, but later fell out with Ptolemy (Aeschin. II. Embassy 26&ndash9, Dem. XXIII. Aristocrates 149). Thebes too became interested in Macedon through its involvement in Thessaly, and in 368, when Thebes was attacking Alexander of Pherae, Athens sent a force under Autocles to support him (Diod. Sic. XV. 71. v). So in 367, when Pelopidas gained the King&rsquos support for peace terms advantageous to Thebes, those terms were to include the disbanding of the Athenian navy (cf. p. 234). Too many states were provoked, and Thebes did not get its treaty, but it was probably at this point that the Athenians erased the reference to the King&rsquos Peace in the prospectus of the League (cf. p. 265: it did not occur to them to erase the hostile reference to Sparta immediately before), and Athens like Sparta gave its support to the satraps in revolt against the King. Ariobarzanes and Philiscus, the agent he sent to Greece in 369/8 (cf. p. 234), were made Athenian citizens (Dem. XXIII. Aristocrates 141, cf. 202), and in 366Timotheus was sent to support Ariobarzanes yet not break the King&rsquos Peace. From autumn 366 to autumn 365 he besieged Samos and captured it from the Persians (Isoc. XV. Antid. Ill, Dem. XV Lib. Rhod. 9), after which Athens shocked the Greek world by not liberating Samos but turning it into an Athenian cleruchy (Diod. Sic. XVIII. 18. ix, Strabo 638. XIV. i. 18, Arist. Rh. II. 1384 B 32&ndash5 reinforced in 362/1, schol. Aeschin. I. Timarchus 53). He was joined by the Spartan Agesilaus in relieving Ariobarzanes when he was besieged in Adramyttium or Assus (Xen. Ages. ii. 26, PolyaenusStrat. VII. 26). In 365/4 he replaced Iphicrates on the Amphipolis front (Dem. XXIII.Aristocrates 149, schol. Aeschin. II. Embassy 31), after which Iphicrates first fought for Cotys against Athens, then retired to fortresses of his own (Dem. XXIII. Aristocrates 130&ndash2). Timotheus captured various cities including Potidaea, which by invitation became another Athenian cleruchy (Diod. Sic. XV. 81. vi, Din. I. Demosthenes 14 cleruchy 362/1IG ii 2 114 = Tod 146
The continuation of this war need not be followed in detail: it included some successes (Timotheus captured Sestos and Crithote, in the Chersonese: Nep. XIII. Timoth. 1. iii, Isoc. XV. Antid. 108, 112) but also some failures (in 360/59, after being defeated near Amphipolis, Timotheus burned his fleet rather than let it fall into enemy hands [schol. Aeschin. II. Embassy 31, Polyaenus Strat. III. 10. viii]). Shortage of money remained a problem:Timotheus issued bronze coins, some of which have been found at Olynthus ([Arist.] Oec. II. 1350 A 23&ndash30, cf. CAH 2 pis. v-vi no. 227). Several commanders were insufficiently successful and were prosecuted Amphipolis continued to elude Athens.
Nearer home Oropus, disputed between Athens and Boeotia (cf. p. 153), was made independent in 404 (cf. Lys. XXXI. Philon 9) but not long afterwards absorbed into Boeotia again (Diod. Sic. XIV. 17. i-iii) it was presumably made independent again under the Peace of Antalcidas but by 373/2 it had placed itself in Athens&rsquo hands (Isoc. XrV. Plataic 20). In 366 Themison, tyrant of Eretria, seized it, claiming to support a body of exiles. Athens recalled Chares from the Peloponnese and tried to recapture it it was entrusted to the Thebans pending arbitration, and they were allowed to keep it (Xen. Hell. VII. iv. 1, Diod. Sic. XV 76. i, schol. Aeschin. III. Ctesiphon 85, Agatharchides FGrH 86 F 8). Chares returned to the Peloponnese and was involved in an unsuccessful attempt &lsquoto keep Corinth safe for the Athenian people&rsquo. As affairs in the Peloponnese became more complicated, in 366 Athens became an ally of Arcadia and in 364 it supported the Arcadians in their war against Elis (cf. pp. 255&ndash6).
In 364 the Thebans stepped up their hostility to Athens. Epaminondas had urged them to build dockyards and a hundred triremes (it is not clear whether all of these were built) he tried to win over Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium (we have a decree in which Cnidus makes Epaminondas itsproxenos, SEG xliv 901, and one in which the Boeotians appoint a Byzantine proxenos, SEG xxxiv 355, but neither is precisely dated) in a naval campaign he drove away an Athenian fleet under Laches (Diod. Sic. XV 78. iv-79. i). Revolts in Ceos in 363/2, dealt with by Chabrias (IG ii 2 111 = R&O 39
Harding 55), may have been encouraged by Thebes&rsquo challenge to Athens, but there seems to have been a local reason, in that the Ceans preferred to function as a single entity while Athens preferred to deal with the cities separately. Whatever Thebes&rsquo naval campaign may have achieved, it was not repeated but in 362 and 361 Alexander of Pherae inThessaly, after being subjected to Thebes, turned against his Athenian allies, attacking some of the Aegean islands and defeating an Athenian fleet under Leosthenes, and even raiding the Piraeus (Diod. Sic. XV 95. i-iii, Polyaenus Strat. VI. 2, [Dem.] L. Polycles 4). In response to that, in 361/0 the Athenians broke off their alliance with Alexander and made an alliance with the federation ofThessalians opposed to him (IG ii 2 116 = R&O 44
In the course of the 360&rsquos Athens had done a great deal to alarm its allies. The founder of an anti-Spartan League had become an ally of Sparta. Already in the 370&rsquos garrisons, however justifiable, and levies of money called syntaxeis had appeared, and Paros had been treated as a colony and required to send offerings to Athenian festivals (R&O 29). Cleruchies in Samos and Potidaea, and attempts at conquest in the north, did not impinge directly on the states which were members of the League, but they were worryingly reminiscent of the fifth century, and the members must have wondered how far the League&rsquos promises would protect them. In Ceos revolts were firmly put down, and some major lawsuits had been made transferable to Athens (IG ii 2 111 = R&O 39
Harding 55). Chares in 361/0 supported the oligarchs in civil strife in Corcyra, and gained Athens a bad reputation (Diod. Sic. XV. 95. iii, Aen.Tact. xi. 13&ndash15). Athens&rsquo alliance with Peloponnesian states in 362/1 was recommended by the synedrion (IG ii 2 112 = R&O 41
Harding 56. 18&ndash19), but there is no sign that for the alliance with the Thessalians it was consulted or given the chance to swear, though the alliance included the League (IG ii 2 116 = R&O 44
The situation in the north was transformed by two deaths. In 360/59 the Thracian Cotys was murdered, and his son Cersebleptes was challenged by two rivals, Berisades and Amadocus. We learn, mostly from Demosthenes, of a series of Athenian attempts to reach a satisfactory settlement with them. After earlier agreements, which he regarded as shameful, in winter 357/6 Chares secured &lsquomost excellent and just&rsquo terms: Thrace was divided between Berisades in the west, Amadocus in the centre and Cersebleptes in the east, but for some purposes was regarded as a single entity, and some Greek cities were regarded both as dependent on the Thracian rulers and as allies owing syntaxeis to Athens (Dem. XXIII. Aristocrats 163&ndash73, cf. IG ii 2 126 = R&O 47
In 359 Perdiccas of Macedon was killed in a war against the Illyrians and succeeded by his brother Philip. One of the rival claimants, Argaeus, was backed by Athens. Philip tried to keep his enemies divided, and withdrew from Amphipolis, suggesting that he would allow Athens to acquire it (for references to secret talks or promises cf. p. 338). The Athenian force failed to support Argaeus, and he was defeated (Diod. Sic. XVI. 2. vi-3. vi). But in 357 Philip captured Amphipolis and retained it for himself, leaving the Athenians to claim that he had cheated them, as a result of which they declared war on him (Diod. Sic. XVI. 8. ii-iii, Isoc. V. Philip 2, Aeschin. II. Embassy 70, III. Ctesiphon 54) at the beginning of the year 356/5 they made an alliance with Philip&rsquos barbarian neighbours (IG ii 2 127 = R&O 53
Harding 70). We shall look at Philip and the Athenians&rsquo dealings with him in chapter 24 but other concerns prevented them from prosecuting the war against him for Amphipolis.
In 357 the Athenians had an important success. Since Leuctra the cities of Euboea had been allied with Thebes, not Athens, but now Athens took advantage of disagreement between pro-Theban and pro-Athenian parties to regain Euboea for Athens - within thirty days according to Aeschines (Diod. Sic. XVI. 7. ii, Aeschin. III. Ctesiphon 85). An inscription of 357/6 preserves the end of the treaty with Carystus and mentions the other cities (IG ii 2 124 = R&O 48
Harding 65), and ends with eight names of generals who swore to it: the first name is erased but decipherable as Chabrias of the second there survives only the beginning, Cha[-]. Editors have usually supposed the second name to be Chares, and have been puzzled as to why Chabrias should have been erased but we obtain an easier timetable and an explanation if we suppose that Chares was not included, because he was away making the final agreement with the Thracian rulers, and that Chabrias&rsquo name was inscribed twice in error and therefore erased once.
But that success was followed by failure in the Social War, Athens&rsquo war with the allies. Different texts point to different dates and durations Diodorus narrates it in two sections, under 358/7 and 356/5, and probably his sections actually belong to the campaigning seasons of 356 and 355. He states that Rhodes, Chios, Cos and Byzantium rose against Athens (we have no other evidence that Cos was a member of the League, but it is not unlikely). In the background was Mausolus of Caria, for whom the Greek world provided the easier option for expansion after the collapse of the Satraps&rsquo Revolt (Dem. XV. Lib. Rhod. 3 Erythrae&rsquos honours for Mausolus, IK. Erythrai und Klazomenai 8 = R&O 56, may have been awarded at this time). An Athenian fleet under Chares blockaded Chios, but was decisively beaten at sea, and Chabrias (not a general, despite Diodorus, so the date must be 356/5) was killed (Diod. Sic. XVI. 7. iii-iv Chabrias Nep. XII. Chab. 4. i, cf. Dem. XX. Leptines 82). In 355 the rebels took the offensive, raiding Lemnos, Imbros and other islands and besieging Samos. Athens sent Timotheus, Iphicrates and Menestheus with sixty ships to join the sixty under Chares (making the largest Athenian fleet known in the period 404&ndash323). They headed for Byzantium and the rebels followed at Embata, between Chios and the mainland, the others refused to fight owing to bad weather, and Chares had to withdraw or fought and was defeated. He denounced his colleagues, who were deposed and recalled for trial (cf. p. 309), and himself retired into the service of Artabazus the satrap of Dascylium, now in revolt against Persia, but was recalled when the Persians protested. There was a fear that Persia might in response support the rebels, so the war ended, with Athens accepting defeat and several east Greek members leaving the League those to the south passed into the orbit of Mausolus (Diod. Sic. XVI. 21&ndash22. ii, Polyaenus Strat. III. 9. xxix loss of members Isoc. VIII. Peace 16, Dem. XV Lib. Rhod. 26 for Artabazus and Mausolus cf. pp. 362&ndash4).
Before and during the war we find further garrisons in allied territory. It was probably in 357/6 (to fit what is known of his career) that Arcesine on Amorgus honoured Androtion, who had been governor for at least two years and had lent money without interest for purposes including the payment of a garrison (IG xn. vii 5 = R&O 51
Harding 68): we do not know why Athens had subjected Arcesine to a governor and a garrison, but on my dating of the war and the inscription this will have been before the war. An Athenian decree of summer 357/6, during the war on all chronologies and arising out of the war, provides for one of the generals to take care of Andros, and for its garrison to be paid &lsquoout of the syntaxeis in accordance with the resolutions of the allies&rsquo (IG ii 2 123 = R&O 52
Defeats at sea and the secession of major allies suggest that Athens was weaker now than at any time since the Peloponnesian War. Isocrates&rsquo pamphlet (VIII) On the Peace belongs to this context: c.380 in his (IV) Panegyric he had foreshadowed the foundation of the League (cf. pp. 263&ndash4), but now he wrote it off as a failure.True peace was needed, not a mere breathing space (§§16-26) Athenian imperialism with its syntaxeis and synedroi had not worked (§29) Athens should stop aiming to rule at sea, which was neither just nor possible nor expedient (§§64-94, 114&ndash15) - but if Athens did so the Greeks would admire it so much that they would concede all that it wanted (§§22-3, 136&ndash40). Xenophon&rsquos Ways and Means (Porot), written about the same time, likewise claims that Athens needs peace, and that a policy of peace rather than war is more likely to make friends for Athens (§v). These works reflect the current mood in Athens: since Leuctra Athenian foreign policy had lost its way, and under a new generation of politicians ambitious foreign adventures were renounced and the priority was given to financial recovery (cf. pp. 371&ndash2, 374&ndash5).
The Last Years of the League
After the Social War the history of the League is bound up with that of Athens&rsquo dealings with Philip of Macedon: for the context cf. chapter 24.The Chalcidians of Olynthus seem to have left the League in the 360&rsquos as a result of Athens&rsquo revived ambitions in the north-east: an Athenian decree of 363/2 refers to &lsquothe war against the Chalcidians and against Amphipolis&rsquo (IG ii 2 110 = R&O 38. 8&ndash9). In 357 Athens and Philip competed for their allegiance, and Philip was the winner (cf. R&O 50
Harding 67), promising to capture Potidaea for them: he did that in 356, sending the Athenians home (Diod. Sic. XVI. 8. iii-v). By 352/1, however, Olynthus was encircled by Philip and worried, and it then made peace with Athens and rejoined the League (Dem. XXIII. Aristocrates 107&ndash9, cf. IG ii 2 211 = Tod 166. 1&ndash3). After Philip had absorbed western and central Thrace, Cersebleptes in the east had come under threat in 353/2, when Chares had captured Sestos, Cersebleptes ceded the Chersonese (except Cardia, on the isthmus) to Athens, and Athens sent cleruchs (Diod. Sic. XVI. 34. iii-iv, cf. references to Athenian archontes in Dem. XXIII. Aristocrates 159&ndash61).
In 349/8 Philip moved against Olynthus, and there was renewed trouble in Euboea. Demosthenes, who by this time wanted to strike against Philip as near as possible to the heart of Macedon, considered Olynthus the more important, but most Athenians attached a higher priority to Euboea: in the event, Euboea passed out of the Athenian orbit and Philip captured Olynthus. Refugees from Olynthus went to Athens (IG ii 2 211 = Tod 166, as normally restored) and to Lemnos (IG xn. vii 4
Athens still had friends, inside and outside the League: there are records of crowns dedicated in Athens by various cities between 354/3 and 345/4 (IG ii 2 1437. 10&ndash18, 1438. 15&ndash16, 1441. 5&ndash18, 1443. 89&ndash122). We happen to know that Mytilene was ruled by an anti-Athenian oligarchy in the late 350&rsquos (Dem. XIII. Organisation 8, XV. Lib. Rhod. 19) and then by a tyrant ([Dem.] XL. Boeotus. ii. 37) but in 347/6 the tyranny was overthrown, perhaps with help from Athens, and Mytilene rejoined the League (IG ii 2 213 = Tod 168
When Athens made peace with Philip in 346, nominally to end the war over Amphipolis, the League was involved. Athens chose a representative of the allies (from Tenedos) to serve on the first embassy to Philip (Aeschin. II. Embassy 20). The synedrion wanted to wait until the results of Athens&rsquo attempts to build up an alliance against Philip were known, but it would then accept whatever Athens decided Athens followed Demosthenes in putting proposals to Philip&rsquos representatives as soon as they arrived (Aeschin. II.Embassy 60&ndash2). The synedrion then wanted a peace which any Greek state could join within three months, but Demosthenes, after establishing that Philip would not accept that, gained approval for a more limited peace.That more limited peace was between Philip and his allies and Athens and its allies ([Dem.] VII. Halonnesus 31, cf. Dem. XIX.Embassy 278). Some Athenians hoped to interpret that to cover every state with which Athens had an alliance, including Phocis and Halus, with which Philip had not been prepared to make peace. Officially, however, &lsquoAthens and its allies&rsquo meant the League: Cersebleptes tried but was not allowed to join the League in time to be included in the peace, and then the synedrion swore to the peace on behalf of the allies (Aeschin. II. Embassy 82&ndash90, III. Ctesiphon 73&ndash4). Later, when Philip offered to renegotiate the peace, the Athenians ensured the failure of the negotiations by making demands which Philip could not accept, applying the principle of possessing what belongs to a state to Amphipolis and also to the island of Halonnesus, which Philip offered to give to them but they said he must &lsquogive back&rsquo, since it belonged to them by right ([Dem.] VII. Halonnesus:Amphipolis §§24-9).
At the end of the 340&rsquos the cities of Euboea returned once more to the Athenian side. Callias of Chalcis, who hoped to form a Euboean league, fell out with Philip and turned to Athens. In 342 Philip enabled unpopular leaders to take control of Eretria and Oreus, but in 341 Athens overthrew them, and Callias was able to include these cities in his league with a special affiliation to the Athenian League, by which they paid syntaxeis only to the Euboean League (Philoch. FGrH 328 FF 159/160
Harding 91/92, Charax FGrH103 F 19
Harding 91, Dem. IX. Phil. Hi. 57&ndash62, Aeschin. III. Ctesiphon 89&ndash105 with schol. 85, 103, Diod. Sic. XVI. 74. i).That was an unusually generous arrangement, and Aeschines complains that Demosthenes deprived Athens of the syntaxeis, but the Athenians had been generous on previous occasions when they were anxious to keep cities loyal (cf. Methone in the 420&rsquos, p. 188 Calchedon and its neighbours in 408, p. 156). Elsewhere Aenus, on the coast of Thrace, deserted Athens for Philip c.341 ([Dem.] LVffl. Theocrines 37&ndash8) but an Athenian decree of 340/39 praises Tenedos, which has lent money to Athens and is therefore not to be subjected to any exactions or assessed by the synedrion for syntaxeis until the loan has been repaid (IG ii 2 233 = R&O 72
In 339 Philip&rsquos entry into the Fourth Sacred War led to an alliance between Athens and Thebes once more but in 338 he defeated them at Chaeronea, and his victory put an end to the League (cf. Paus. I. 25. iii), with Athens and all the other mainland Greeks except Sparta enrolled in the League of Corinth under Philip&rsquos leadership.
Isocrates&rsquo last major work, (XII) Panathenaic, was written c.342-339, and aimed to show that it was Athens rather than Sparta that had benefited the Greeks (§§24, 96, 112). In §§53-69, 88&ndash94, he contrasts Athens&rsquo conduct in the Delian League favourably with Sparta&rsquos conduct after the Peloponnesian War he scarcely mentions the Second League, except to say that when Sparta&rsquos supremacy was ended two or three Athenian generals copied the Spartans&rsquo bad habits (§§100-1).
NOTE ON FURTHER READING
For general studies of Athenian policy in the fourth century see E. Badian, &lsquoThe Ghost of Empire: Reflections on Athenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century BC&lsquo, in Eder (ed.), Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr., 79&ndash106 P. Harding, &lsquoAthenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century&rsquo, Klio lxxvii 1995, 105&ndash25.
For the beginning of the fourth century see R. Seager, &lsquoThrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396&ndash386 bc&rsquo, JHS lxxxvii 1967, 95&ndash115 G. L. Cawkwell, &lsquoThe Imperialism of Thrasybulus&rsquo, CQ 2 xxvi 1976, 270&ndash7&rsquo.
On the Second Athenian League Marshall, TTie Second Athenian Confederacy, is still useful see also Larsen, Representative Government Cargill, The Second Athenian League (believing that after the closing of the inscribed list there were no further members and that Athens kept its promises to the members).
On the League&rsquos foundation I follow D. G. Rice, &lsquoXenophon, Diodorus and the Year 379/378 bc&rsquo, YCS xxiv 1975, 95&ndash130 (foundation after Sphodrias&rsquo raid), against G. L. Cawkwell, &lsquoThe Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy&rsquo, CQ 2 xxiii 1973, 47&ndash60 (foundation before Sphodrias&rsquo raid, as in Diod. Sic. XV. 28&ndash9). For a recent attempt to settle the chronology of the later 370&rsquos see C. M. Fauber, &lsquoDeconstructing 375&ndash371 BC: Towards An Unified Chronology&rsquo, Ath. 2 lxxvii 1999, 481&ndash506. On the chronology of Androtion&rsquos career, Athens&rsquo recovery of Euboea and the Social War I follow G. L. Cawkwell, &lsquoNotes on the Social War&rsquo, C&M xxiii 1962, 34&ndash49: among other views, earlier dates had been proposed, for Androtion&rsquos year in the council with effects for Euboea and the Social War, by E. Schweigert, &lsquoGreek Inscriptions, 4. A Decree Concerning Elaious&rsquo, Hesp.viii 1939, 12&ndash17 D. M. Lewis, &lsquoNotes on Attic Inscriptions, xiii. Androtion and the Temple Treasures&rsquo, BSA xlix 1954, 39&ndash49.
Peace of Philocrates, 346 BC - History
Athenian statesman, recognized as the greatest of ancient Greek orators, who roused Athens to oppose Philip of Macedon and, later, his son Alexander the Great. His speeches provide valuable information on the political, social, and economic life of 4th-century Athens.
Demosthenes, a contemporary of Plato and Aristotle, was the son of a wealthy sword maker. His father died when he was seven, leaving a large inheritance, but the boy's unscrupulous guardians took advantage of their position, and when he came of age Demosthenes received very little of his estate. His strong desire to sue his guardian, Aphobus, in the courts, coupled with a delicate physique that prevented him from receiving the customary Greek gymnastic education, led him to train himself as an orator. He also studied legal rhetoric. In his Parallel Lives Plutarch, the Greek historian and biographer, relates that Demosthenes built an underground study where he exercised his voice, shaving one half of his head so that he could not go out in public. Plutarch adds that Demosthenes had a speech defect, "an inarticulate and stammering pronunciation" that he overcame by speaking with pebbles in his mouth and by reciting verses when running or out of breath. He also practiced speaking before a large mirror.
Despite this self-improvement program, his first youthful speaking efforts in the public Assembly met with disaster he was laughed at by his audiences. His lawsuits against Aphobus and two other guardians in 363 were more successful they produced little money, but he learned much about speaking strategy and methods of argument. Three of his speeches against Aphobus and two against the sculptor Antenor have survived.
Demosthenes as speech writer.
At the age of 20 the young Demosthenes found himself without his fortune, without a trade or profession, and with seemingly little prospect for success in any field. But his rhetorical skill had been noticed. In 4th-century democratic Athens every citizen who wished to prosecute a lawsuit or to defend himself against accusation had to do the speaking himself. Not every citizen, of course, possessed sufficient skill to write his own speechesa fact that gave rise to the practice of employing a speech writer (logographer) to prepare a speech for such occasions. Demosthenes' skill in his speeches against Aphobus was recognized by wealthier men in need of a logographer he soon acquired wealthy and powerful clients willing to pay well for his services. Thus began a lifelong career that he continued even during his most intense involvement in the political struggle against Philip of Macedon, much as a modern lawyer might retain a private practice while engaged in public affairs.
Demosthenes was already 30 when, in 354, he made his first major speech before the Assembly. The speech, "On the Navy Boards," was a marked success. The Assembly or Ecclesia ( Ekklesia ), a legislative body composed of all adult male Athenian citizens, had convened to consider a rumoured threat against Athens by the King of Persia. Demosthenes' tightly reasoned oration helped persuade the Athenians to build up their naval strength quietly to show the Persians that, though Athens would not launch an attack, it was ready to fight. He pointed out that, while Athens would have no allies if it attacked first, every other Greek city-state would join Athens if the Persians were the first to attack. Here, for the first time, Demosthenes sounded a theme that was to run through his whole public careerthe policy that Athens could best keep its democratic freedom by remaining independent of all other cities while, on the other hand, being ready to make temporary alliances whenever danger threatened. In the same speech, revealing his penchant for careful fiscal planning, he proposed an elaborate revision of the method used to tax the wealthy to raise money for ships.
Leader of the democratic faction.
From this point on (354), Demosthenes' career is virtually the history of Athenian foreign policy. It was not very long before his oratorical skill made him, in effect, the leader of what today might be called the democratic party. Some interests, especially the wealthy, would have preferred an oligarchy instead of a democracy many merchants would have preferred peace at almost any price. While they agreed that the Macedonians were barbarians, most Athenian citizens distrusted other Greek city-states such as Thebes and Sparta. The Athenian Assembly was a loosely organized, often tumultuous body of up to 6,000 male citizens it was capable of shouting down a speaker it did not like or of routing him with laughter. Any citizen could speak, but the criteria were so high that only the best orators survived for long. In this turbulent arena Demosthenes stood out. Contemporaries refer to him as "a water drinker" that is, a severe and perhaps forbidding personality. Although name-calling was common practice in the Assembly, Demosthenes' wit was exceptionally caustic when defending himself in his speech "On the Crown" against the attacks of his lifelong rival, Aeschines, he did not scruple to call him "sly beast," "idle babbler," "court hack," and "polluted." Demosthenes was not merely better at abuse than most he also realized the advantage of making an audience lose respect for his opponent.
He was an assiduous student of Greek history, using detailed historical parallels in almost all his public speeches, and reportedly copied out Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War eight times in order to improve his command of language and to absorb its history. He constantly asked the Athenians to recall their own history, to remember their past belief in democracy, and to remind themselves how much they hated tyrants. His love of democracy gives his speeches a humanistic breadth that makes them interesting even today. Demosthenes was also extremely industrious. Plutarch says that it was his habit to sit down at night and go over the conversations and speeches he had heard during the day, experimenting with various replies or speeches that could have been made. He excelled whenever he could prepare his speeches carefully in advance, but the nature of Athenian political life must often have forced him to reply to an opponent on the spur of the moment. Unfortunately, because all of the surviving speeches are carefully edited texts, it cannot be established how often Demosthenes spoke extemporaneously.
His famous speech in 354 "On the Navy Boards" was addressed to the threat from the East. Meanwhile, in Macedonia, to the north, the young king Philip, almost the same age as Demosthenes, was gradually annexing Greek cities south of his borders. In 356 Philip had captured an Athenian possession in Thrace, after hoodwinking the Athenians with promises to protect the city, and in 354 he took another Athenian possession. By 353 both Sparta and Arcadia were asking Athens for military assistance against Philip. When he continued to move south, employing bribery and threat as well as military force, the Athenians sent a small force to close off the pass at Thermopylae. Although Philip turned aside to the coast of Thrace, avoiding a direct confrontation with Athens, his intentions were clear. Yet many Athenians continued to believe that Philip's threat was transitory.
The Philippics. Early in 351 Demosthenes delivered a speech against Philip, the so-called "First Philippic," that established him as the leader of the opposition to Macedonian imperial ambitions. For the next 29 years Demosthenes never wavered as Plutarch says, "The object which he chose for himself in the commonwealth was noble and just, the defense of the Grecians against Philip." In the "First Philippic" he reminded the Athenians that they had once defeated the Spartans, who were as strong as Philip, and sarcastically pointed out that Philip would never have conquered their territories if he had been as timid as the Athenians seemed to be. He concluded by challenging his countrymen to take their affairs in their own hands rather than let Philip win by default.
This goading speech nonetheless failed to rouse the Athenians. Philip advanced into Chalcidice, threatening the city of Olynthus, which appealed to Athens. In 349 Demosthenes delivered three stirring speeches (the "Olynthiacs") to elicit aid for Olynthus, but the city fell the following year without significant help from Athens. Finally, Philip and the Athenians agreed in April 346 to the Peace of Philocrates Demosthenes, partly to gain time to prepare for the long struggle he saw ahead, agreed to the peace and went as one of the ambassadors to negotiate the treaty with Philip. During the negotiations, Philip, recognizing Demosthenes' eloquence as a threat to his plans, ignored him and addressed his fellow ambassador Aeschines instead. The two men returned from the embassy bitter foes, Demosthenes denouncing Aeschines and Aeschines assuring everyone of Philip's good intentions.
In his oration "On the Peace" late in 346 Demosthenes, though condemning the terms of the treaty of Philocrates, argued that it had to be honoured. Meanwhile, Philip continued his tactic of setting the Greek city-states, such as Thebes and Sparta, against each other. Demosthenes was one of several ambassadors sent out on a futile tour of the Peloponnesus to enlist support against Philip. In retaliation Philip protested to Athens about certain statements made by these ambassadors. Demosthenes' "Second Philippic," in 344, retorted that he would never have agreed to the Peace of Philocrates if he had known that Philip would not honour his word moreover, he asserted, Aeschines and others had lulled the Athenians into a false sense of security. The issue came to a public trial in the autumn of 343, when Demosthenes, in his speech "The False Legation," accused Aeschines of rendering false reports, giving bad counsel, disobeying instructions, and being susceptible to bribery. The court, however, acquitted Aeschines.
The tangled pattern of threat and counter-threat continued into 341, until an Athenian general incurred Philip's wrath for operating too near one of his towns in the Chersonese. Philip demanded his recall, but Demosthenes replied in a speech, "On the Chersonese," that the motive behind the Macedonian's "scheming and contriving" was to weaken the Athenians' will to oppose Philip's conquests. "Philip is at war with us," he declared, "and has broken the peace." Shortly afterward, Demosthenes delivered his "Third Philippic," perhaps the most successful single speech in his long campaign against Philip. As a result, Demosthenes became controller of the navy and could thus carry out the naval reforms he had proposed in 354. In addition, a grand alliance was formed against Philip, including Byzantium and former enemies of Athens, such as Thebes. Indecisive warfare followed, with Athens strong at sea but Philip nearly irresistible on land. The Macedonian army was well organized under a single brilliant commander who used cavalry in coordination with highly disciplined infantry, while the Greek alliance depended upon what was essentially a group of citizens' militia.
Disaster came in 338, when Philip defeated the allies in a climactic battle at Chaeronea in north-central Greece. According to Plutarch, Demosthenes was in the battle but fled after dropping his arms. Whether or not he disgraced himself in this way, it was Demosthenes whom the people chose to deliver the funeral oration over the bodies of those slain in the battle. After the peace concluded by the Athenian orator and diplomat Demades, Philip acted with restraint and, though the pro-Macedonian faction was naturally greatly strengthened by his victory, he refrained from occupying Athens. Demosthenes came under several forms of subtle legislative attack by Aeschines and others.
In 336 Greece was stunned by the news that Philip had been assassinated. When his son Alexander succeeded him, many Greeks believed that freedom was about to be restored. But within a year Alexander proved that he was an even more implacable foe than his fatherfor, when the city of Thebes rebelled against him in 335, he destroyed it. A string of victories emboldened Alexander to demand that Athens surrender Demosthenes and seven other orators who had opposed his father and himself only a special embassy to Alexander succeeded in having that order rescinded. Shortly thereafter, Alexander began his invasion of Asia that took him as far as India and left Athens free of direct military threat from him.
In 330, nevertheless, judging that the pro-Alexandrian faction was still strong in Athens, Aeschines pressed his charges of impropriety against Ctesiphonfirst made six years earlierfor proposing that Demosthenes be awarded a gold crown for his services to the state. The real target was, of course, Demosthenes, for Aeschines accused Ctesiphon of making a false statement when he praised the orator's patriotism and public service. The resulting oratorical confrontation between Aeschines and Demosthenes aroused interest throughout Greece, because not only Demosthenes but also Athenian policy of the past 20 years was on trial. A jury of 500 citizens was the minimum required in such cases, but a large crowd of other Athenians and even foreigners flocked to the debate.
Delivery of "On the Crown." The oration "On the Crown," Demosthenes' reply to Aeschines' charges of vacillating in his policy, accepting bribes, and displaying cowardice in battle, is universally acknowledged as a masterpiece of rhetorical art. It covers the entire two decades of Greek involvement with Philip and Alexander, contrasting Demosthenes' policies in every case with what he terms the treachery of Aeschines as an agent of the Macedonians. As always, his command of historical detail is impressive. Over and over again he asks his audience what needed to be done in a crisis and who did it. Addressing Aeschines directly, he says, "Your policies supported our enemy, mine, our country's." His scathing epithets picture Aeschines as a contemptible turncoat, a hireling of Philip. The jury's verdict was resoundingly clearAeschines failed to receive even one-fifth of the votes and was thus obliged to go into exile. Demosthenes and his policies had received a massive vote of popular approval.
Six years later, however, he was convicted of a grave crime and forced to flee from prison and himself go into exile. He was accused of taking 20 talents deposited in Athens by Harpalus, a refugee from Alexander. Demosthenes was found guilty, fined 50 talents, and imprisoned. The circumstances of the case are still unclear. Demosthenes may well have intended to use the money for civic purposes, and it is perhaps significant that the court fined him only two and one-half times the amount involved instead of the 10 times usually levied in such cases. His escape from prison made it impossible for him to return to Athens to raise money for the fine. The onetime leader of the Athenians was now a refugee from his own people.
Another dramatic reversal occurred the very next year, however, when Alexander died. The power of the Macedonians seemed finally broken a new alliance was concluded against them. The Athenians recalled Demosthenes from exile and provided money to pay his fine. But at the approach of Antipater, Alexander's successor, Demosthenes and other orators again fled the city. His former friend Demades then persuaded the Athenians to sentence Demosthenes to death. While fleeing Antipater's soldiers, he killed himself by taking poison. Following his long service to the state, which nonetheless ended in abandonment by the fickle Athenian citizenry, Demosthenes' death can be viewed as a symbol of the decline of Athenian democracy.
For almost 30 years Demosthenes rallied the citizens of Athens to oppose the military power of Philip of Macedon and Philip's son Alexander the Great. Demosthenes' speech "On the Crown," the defense of his career delivered in 330, has been termed "the greatest speech of the greatest orator in the world." In the century following his death, the scholars at the Library of Alexandria carefully edited the manuscripts of his famous speeches. His fame was such that, when the Roman orator Cicero delivered a series of speeches in 44 BC opposing Mark Antony, in circumstances not unlike those in which Demosthenes opposed Philip, Cicero's speeches were called Philippics too. Roman schoolboys studied Demosthenes' speeches as part of their own oratorical training. During the Middle Ages and Renaissance, his name was a synonym for eloquence. Modern scholars such as Werner Jaeger present a more dispassionate view by pointing to the highly complex political issues that Demosthenes handled with his oratorical skill. Whatever the interpretation of his personality and work, he has in every age been regarded as one of the world's greatest orator-statesmen. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Article)